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# The Intergenerational Transmission of Majority-Group Ties and Their Political Consequences\*

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In this study, I highlight an underappreciated catalyst for political socialisation in immigrant societies—the intergenerational transmission of majority ties. Drawing on nine waves of German panel data from the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries* (2011–2022), I demonstrate that the “Germanness” of parental networks shapes youth respondents’ majority-group ties in adolescence, and illustrate how these social inheritances influence the Germanness of adolescent networks during the transition to early adulthood. By Wave 9, when most respondents are in their late 20s, the Germanness of social networks is closely linked to political preferences: native majorities with more German-centric networks are *less* likely to support left-wing parties, while the inverse is true for most of their immigrant-origin peers. These patterns reflect distinct but complementary mechanisms: for immigrants and their descendants, majority ties signal structural assimilation into “mainstream” political culture and convergence with liberal-cosmopolitan norms; for natives, ethnically diverse social networks reinforce enculturation into progressive political communities. Overall, these findings show that political socialisation operates not only through the transmission of beliefs and cultural orientations, but through the concomitant reproduction of social environments.

**Keywords:** Political Socialisation, Social Networks, Majority Ties, Political Preferences.

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\*I am grateful to Félix Krawatzek, Hakob Matevosyan, the rest of the team at ZOiS, and Maria Abascal for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this manuscript. All errors are my own.

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# 1 Introduction

A large body of scholarship has examined how our social networks influence, and are influenced by, the political orientations we encode as we engage with the social world (Baldassarri and Jong 2025; Brown and Enos 2021; Lim 2008; Mutz 2002). Recent studies suggest that sociopolitical segregation—i.e., the partitioning of networks along partisan lines—can sharpen affective polarization and related measures of partisan antipathy (Hobolt, Lawall, and Tilley 2024; Lerman et al. 2024; Rawlings 2022). Similarly, the *ethnic attributes* of our ties (homophily, fragmentation, and so on) carry political implications as well: e.g., the informational diffusion and collective action required to produce political change at scale are sensitive to the ethnic attributes of networks at different levels of geographic resolution (Eubank 2019; Larson and Lewis 2017), while immigrants’ connections to natives can instill a political consciousness in newcomers and facilitate their political incorporation into the society of destination (Bratsberg et al. 2021; Facchini, Patacchini, and Steinhardt 2015).

The present study builds on these existing strands of research by bringing *political socialisation* into the analytic frame. To this end, I (1) explore how the ethnic composition of social networks—and specifically, their *majority skew*—is transmitted across generations among native- and immigrant-origin respondents; and (2) adjudicate whether these transmission processes are politically consequential in diverse, immigrant societies like Germany—the empirical setting where the current study takes place. Analytically, I draw on long-running German panel data from the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries* (2011-2022) to evaluate the propositions outlined in the sections to follow. Across three empirical stages, I furnish three key findings.

First, using dyadic parent-adolescent data, I show that the Germanness of parental networks is associated with the Germanness of youth networks at Wave 1, with similar associative patterns observed across immigrant generations. Second, using panel data from Waves 1 to 9, I show that the German skew of parental networks in Wave 1 predicts the Germanness of youth networks over time, although generational differences begin to emerge in early adulthood. Third, using data from Wave 9, I show that the Germanness of respondents’ social networks is tightly linked to their political preferences: native respondents with more German-centric networks are less likely

to support left-wing parties in their late-20s, while the inverse holds for most of their immigrant-origin peers.

Taken together, these results suggest that parental interventions into the relational lifeworlds of their children (whether through direct or indirect channels) do not only facilitate ethnic socialisation, but a kind of *political socialisation* as well: i.e., to influence the ethnic character of a child's social network is to shape the political parties and movements they are likely to support as adults—especially in an era marked by the normalisation and ascendance of far-right movements animated by anti-immigrant zealotry (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020; Golder 2016; Mudde 2019; Rydgren 2007; Umansky, Sened, and Kohler 2025). In this way, my study demonstrates how political socialisation operates not only through the intergenerational transmission of ideas, partisan identities, and moral orientations, but also via the concomitant reproduction of social environments—relational contexts structured by ethnicity (the focus here), gender, sexuality, and other axes of differentiation.

The remainder of my paper is organised as follows. First, I offer a brief overview of the literature on political socialisation and posit that the reproduction of *ethnic* networks should be viewed as a political phenomenon. Then, I develop a theoretical framework that brings research on boundary-making and assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Zhao 2025) into conversation with work on the politics of immigration and political culture (Alizade 2025; Mason and Wronski 2018; Okura 2025). After outlining my estimation strategy and presenting key results, I conclude by highlighting directions for future research.

## 2 Political Socialisation and Transmission

Generations of scholars have argued that our orientations towards the political world, and our cultural dispositions more broadly (see Kiley and Vaisey 2020), cohere amidst the volatilities of early-life socialisation (Campbell 1980; Hyman 1959; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). According to canonical work in this tradition, parents transmit their political sensibilities and partisan identities to their offspring, and—at least in the contemporary U.S.—their partisan antipathies as well (Iyengar, Konitzer, and Tedin 2018; Tyler and Iyengar

2023; but see Dinas 2014). The mechanisms facilitating political transmission may be direct or indirect, and correspond to explicit edicts, cues, or reinforcements dispensed by parental agents, or flow through more implicit and “background” socialisation channels (imitation, modelling, inter alia) forming within families. The accumulation of these direct and indirect influences shapes *social learning* (cf. Bandura 1969) about the political field in adolescence, which unfolds alongside more general forms of cultural acquisition (e.g., Bourdieu 1984; Calarco 2014; Lareau 2011) and—for immigrant-origin youth—assimilatory change (e.g., Gordon 1964; Park and Burgess 1969; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Much of the political transmission literature has foregrounded the reproduction of political beliefs and attitudes within families—and has produced a wealth of insights in turn. However, if empirical assessments of how families shape political socialisation are broadly limited to domains of transmission that carry a sharply political charge (e.g., partisan identities, turnout behaviour, beliefs about foreign policy), we risk masking the political significance of other forms of social reproduction that are seemingly orthogonal to, or at least distant from, the political realm.

Research on polarisation offers a useful parallel. As DellaPosta (2020) explains, when the issue space for partisan disagreement is restricted to well-established zones of political contention, “... the only residue of polarization that can be uncovered ... would be heightened alignment across issues that the researcher has defined a priori as being most relevant to the study of polarization, typically issues that can be widely categorized as ‘political’ in nature,” thereby generating a kind of omitted variable bias where the political valence of seemingly non-political attributes (e.g., one’s lifestyle preferences) is ignored by design (cf. DellaPosta, Shi, and Macy 2015). If we adopt a more agnostic posture and scrutinise a broader set of issues, the contours of polarisation should, in contrast, be easier to sketch (cf. DellaPosta 2020). The same logic applies to analyses of political socialisation within households: i.e., exploring family-level continuities and ruptures in “non-political” domains can, perhaps ironically, yield novel insights into how political orientations are forged in the crucible of adolescence.

In the current study, I draw on this intuition to analyse the intergenerational reproduction of *ethnic* ties—and specifically, their *majority skew* in diverse, immigrant societies like Germany. Just as “non-political” beliefs and preferences (e.g., one’s



affinity for lattes, hunting, astrology, self-help novels, or wearing masks on metros) can buttress political conflict by activating a steady stream of cultural associations and stimulating the diffusion of competing interpretations (Goldberg and Singell 2024; Goldberg and Stein 2018), the ethnic composition of our social worlds—while not political in the thick sense of the term—can influence which parties and movements we gravitate towards as adults. I develop this idea further in the section below.

### 3 How Majority Ties Inform Political Preferences

Of course, linking social ties to political socialisation is not a novel pursuit (Campbell 2013; Langton 1967; Sebert, Jennings, and Niemi 1974), with recent work detailing how networks reinforce political socialisation through contagion, segregation, neighbourhood-level processes and other mechanistic channels (e.g., Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006; Fowler 2005; Rawlings 2022). These studies, along with the canonical literature reviewed earlier, have helped clarify how political dispositions emerge in response to familial *and* extrafamilial forces (like one's proximate ties). However, they have underappreciated how evolutionary currents reshaping the topography of political fields—the rise of parties on the far right and new left, durable demographic changes in the electorate, *inter alia*—are imbuing the ethnic composition of social networks with a political charge *net of* their role in spreading political information or spurring collective action. Take the case of mass politics in Europe. Across much of the European heartland, debates about immigration—and the competing visions of nationalism, liberalism and *civilizationalism* that enliven them—are central to civic and political life in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century (Alizade 2025; Brubaker 2017; Mudde 2019). Against this backdrop, the political resonance of ethnicity is heightened, and ethnic ties may function as diacritical markers of one's political and moral convictions. Within social fields of this sort, the intergenerational transmission of ethnic ties is a decidedly political phenomenon.

Using this insight as a point of departure, the current study scrutinises the transmission—as well as the downstream political significance—of ties to *native majorities*. I do so for several reasons. First, categorical distinctions, social divisions, and status asymmetries distinguishing natives from immigrants are defining features

of the institutional and cultural order in host societies around the world (Alba 2005; Zhao 2025). Second, these boundaries are central to moralised cultural conflict in the sphere of institutional politics. As Mudde (2007) explains, nativism serves as the core ideological engine of radical, right-wing parties (cf. Golder 2016; Rydgren 2007), and as these parties have gained ground, their mainstream rivals have increasingly cleaved to anti-immigrant discourses and positions (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020, 2021; Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2025), sharpening boundaries between immigrants and natives in turn. Third, friendships with natives have long served as critical indicators of assimilatory change (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964), and can elucidate how majority ties are linked to immigrant integration, and how integration shapes political preferences—a point I return to shortly.

More generally, analysing friendships with native majorities allows me to highlight two interrelated mechanisms that infuse the reproduction of ethnic ties with a political charge. The first mechanism is broadly interpretative or intersubjective in nature. Drawing on recent work by Okura (2025), I posit that beliefs about the alignment between immigrant-origin people and political parties—say, cultural associations connecting immigrants to the *Democratic Party* in the U.S. or left-leaning parties in Germany (cf. Alizade 2025)—exist as dynamic features of what I call *mainstream* political culture. This “culture” is defined by a widely (but not universally) shared cultural-cognitive model of the political field that emerges through the bundling of issues, positions, social groups, and frames in the belief space and their translation into political *cleavages*—i.e., major social divides that animate political conflict and organise political competition (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967).<sup>1</sup> Figure 1 presents a simple and stylised representation of this model.

In much of postwar Europe, political cleavages have formed not only along the classic left-right economic axis rooted in the struggle between capital and labour, but—increasingly—around a series of *cultural* axes that link pro-immigrant sensibilities to progressive and “postmaterialist” ideologies (e.g., multiculturalism, environmentalism, feminism, sexual liberalism) and *anti*-immigrant positions to ethnopluralism, traditionalism, conservatism, and moral orthodoxy (see Figure 1; cf. Abou-Chadi and Krause 2021; Ford and Jennings 2020; Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty 2021). As noted, this model of the political field is not evenly or uniformly

<sup>1</sup> Crucially, cleavages can endure even as the party system within a polity evolves.




Figure 1: *Mainstream* cultural-cognitive model of the political cleavage structure—a simplified, two-dimensional representation.

endorsed within polities (see Gidron and Tichelbaecker 2025).<sup>2</sup> Still, most natives—having been socialised into the mainstream political culture described above—likely possess general, if imprecise, intuitions about how parties are dispersed within this high-dimensional conceptual space. If so, and given the general tendency to bring our political self-understandings and behavioural patterns into alignment with our interpersonal networks (cf. Boutyline and Willer 2017; Mason 2016; Mason and Wronski 2018; Rawlings 2022), we should expect natives who champion progressive, left-wing parties to have less majority-centric networks, and those with more majority-centric networks to support parties on the right at a higher rate.

How do immigrant-origin people fit into this general equation? The second explanatory mechanism referenced earlier offers important clues: to put it simply, ethnic ties also acquire a political charge through the *boundary-making* strategies individuals pursue to negotiate social difference in the face of diversity (Wimmer 2008; Zolberg and Woon 1999). As I will clarify, these strategies are especially consequential

<sup>2</sup> Moreover, to assume that voters *seamlessly* project this diffuse web of associations as avatars in their minds—and, in the vein of the *oversocialised man* (Wrong 1961), vote accordingly—rests on an impoverished understanding of human cognition (see Martin 2010)

for understanding political heterogeneity among immigrants and their descendants. Of course, natives also engage in boundary-making—say, by *contracting* membership in privileged social communities like the nation or *blurring* the resonance of ethnic distinctions by *expanding* the bounds of inclusion (Abascal 2020; Lukk 2024; Zhao 2025). Politically, natives’ boundary-making strategies should correspond to the same basic expectations detailed in the previous paragraph: those who favour boundary expansion or blurring should be more inclined to support progressive parties on the left and to cultivate networks that are less native-centric, while the inverse should hold for native majorities who pursue boundary contraction.

Among immigrant-origin people, the story is more contingent. Those whose friendship networks include large shares of natives are likely pursuing boundary *blurring* or *expansion*—i.e., to dissolve social distinctions in the spirit of inclusion—and exhibit signs of structural assimilation as well (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964; Lorenz et al. 2021). Boundary *crossing*, the classical model of individual-level assimilation (Zhao 2025), is another possibility: in this scenario, hyper-selected immigrants befriend natives without designs on reimagining intergroup relations, a process “akin to a conversion ... with all of the social and psychic burdens a conversion process entails” (Nee and Alba 2013: 368). While I presuppose that individual-level crossing is less likely in modern immigrant societies, all three strategies should yield similar political consequences by nesting immigrants in social environments populated by natives who are, relative to majority peers without minority ties, pursuing more inclusionary boundary-making strategies. Within these environments, liberal-cosmopolitan norms are widely circulated, diversity is *relatively* normalised, and immigrant-origin people are assimilating into the mainstream political culture mentioned in the foregoing discussion—one that links their social location as non-natives to progressive politics. Accordingly, immigrant-origin people with more majority ties should be more likely to support progressive, left-wing parties.

Conversely, immigrant-origin people with fewer majority ties are, on balance, pursuing forms of boundary *contraction* that shift the locus of collective identification away from the mainstream and towards ethnoreligious communities at “lower levels of differentiation” (Wimmer 2013: 55). Within these communities, models of political space may not align with the received wisdom embedded in mainstream political culture. Much like the classic “liberal-conservative” cleavage has limited purchase in

Table 1: Connecting Majority Ties to Political Preferences

<i>Fewer Majority Ties</i>			
	Encoded Model in Figure 1?	Boundary-Making Strategy?	Prefers Left-Leaning Party?
Native Majority	Likely	Blurring or Expansion	Likely
Immigrant-Origin	Less Likely	Contraction	Less Likely
<i>More Majority Ties</i>			
	Encoded Model in Figure 1?	Boundary-Making Strategy?	Prefers Left-Leaning Party?
Native Majority	Likely	Contraction	Less Likely
Immigrant-Origin	Likely	Blurring, Expansion, or Crossing	Likely

Black American communities (Jefferson 2024), the cultural alignment mechanisms connecting immigrant status to environmentalism, feminism, and sexual liberalism may not resonate with immigrant-origin people embedded in dense minority-skewed networks on the margins of society—a sign of *ethnic enclosure* (Abascal 2017; Liang 1994; Portes 1984). Consequently, these individuals should be comparatively *less* likely to support left-wing parties and more likely to support parliamentary parties on the right. To simplify matters, Table 1 highlights proposed links between majority ties and political preferences for the young Germans featured in the analyses to follow.

## 4 Key Expectations

Having reviewed research on political socialisation and the political significance of majority ties, my guiding assumptions may be summarised as follows. Broadly, I assume that political dispositions are forged in the haze of adolescence and that this is, in part, rooted in the intergenerational transmission of majority ties. In my view, this general process gives way to different *kinds* of political outcomes as a function of immigrant status. For these assumptions to hold, there should be strong intergenerational associations linking the native concentration of parents' networks to the nativeness of adolescents' social ties, *ceteris paribus*. These social inheritances observed in adolescence should continue to condition the composition of children's social worlds as they advance through the life course, providing a stringent test of the durability of parental influence during the transition to adulthood. Finally,

majority ties in adulthood should be strongly associated with political preferences, with associative patterns differing by generational status.

Specifically, natives with fewer co-ethnic ties should be more likely to support left-wing parties, while the inverse should hold for majorities with denser co-ethnic networks. Conversely, immigrant-origin individuals with more majority ties should be more inclined to support parties on the left, while those with fewer native ties should be less inclined to do so. More generally, heterogeneity along the native, non-native divide should fade across successive immigrant generations—consistent with the basic tenets of neoassimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003).

## 5 Data and Methods

### 5.1 Data and Setting

To test these propositions, I draw on long-running panel data from the German leg of the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries* (CILS-DE). The CILS-DE features large samples of immigrant- and native-origin respondents in Germany who were interviewed across nine measurement occasions from 2011 (when they were about 15-16 years old) to 2022 (when they were about 26-27). The first wave of the survey includes dyadic parent-adolescent data, and the ninth marks the introduction of modules on political preferences. This longitudinal design allows me to trace the intergenerational transmission of majority ties, follow how these ties evolve over time, and assess whether the majority skew of social networks acquires a partisan valence in early adulthood.

As a case study, Germany provides substantial analytic leverage as well. The country “had in the 1990s become the world’s most important destination for migrants” (Koopmans et al. 2005: 1) and played a central role in the so-called refugee crisis of 2015-2017 that shocked political systems throughout Europe, fuelling the rise and normalisation of the radical right (Mudde 2019; Valentim 2024) and sharpening political divisions over immigration (Alizade 2025). Moreover, the electoral ascendance of the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in 2017 represented a dramatic rejection of the anti-radical right norms that powerfully constrained political

possibilities in the postwar era, suggesting that “Germany is one of the most recent European countries to have witnessed the breakthrough of the radical right” (Valentim 2024: 189–190). The young Germans featured in the CILS-DE were thus socialised at a time (mid-2010s to 2020s) when the politics of immigration were fiercely contested, the boundaries of nationhood were hotly debated, and the country itself was steadily diversifying—developments that likely infused ethnic ties with a sharp political charge.

We see this diversity reflected in CILS-DE data. There are over 20 heritage societies represented in the pooled panel, with most immigrant-origin respondents having roots in Turkey, Poland, the Former Soviet Union, and the Former Yugoslavia. The relationship between majority ties and political preferences may, of course, be meaningfully conditioned by one’s ethnic origin—an attribute that is highly correlated with, but not reducible to, generational status. In this study, I avoid introducing higher-order interactions implicating ethnicity, immigrant generation, and my focal regressors, which would substantially increase variance and muddle interpretation. Instead, I choose to highlight associative patterns by immigrant generation with parsimony in mind—a long-running tradition in migration research that produces tractable empirical models that preserve statistical (and explanatory) power.

## 5.2 Analytic Strategy

My analysis unfolds in three stages. First, I draw on dyadic parent-adolescent data and fit linear regression models to test whether the Germanness of parental networks predicts the Germanness of youths’ social networks in Wave 1. Second, using nine waves of panel data, I estimate a linear growth model to assess whether the majority skew of parental ties constrains the Germanness of youths’ networks during the transition to adulthood. Third, drawing on data from Wave 9 of the CILS-DE, I fit a series of multinomial logistic regression models to examine the association between majority ties and political preferences in early adulthood.

Across all stages, I test whether key quantities of interest (e.g., intergenerational associations in the majority skew of social networks) vary by immigrant generation—a discrete variable with four levels: 1<sup>st</sup> Generation, 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation, Above 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation, and Native. I adjust for key background variables (religious affiliation, gender) but allow covariates to differ slightly across stages (see the relevant figure



captions). In all models, missing data are treated via listwise deletion. Descriptives for all variables are provided in the [appendix](#), and details on robustness checks and sample sizes are presented with the results that follow.

### 5.3 Focal Predictor and Outcome Measures

What do *Germanness*, *majority skew* and *majority ties* refer to in concrete terms? Throughout my analysis, these labels are used interchangeably to describe a simple (but intuitive) index that captures the *relative* concentration of ethnic Germans in a respondent's social network. In essence, this index reflects a difference score between the self-reported share of ethnic Germans in a respondent's network (measured along a five-point scale) and the average—or in select robustness checks, maximum—value for the other putative ethnic groups under consideration: Italian, Polish, Russian, Turkish and Other. This difference score is rescaled from 0 to 1 so that 0 indicates that a respondent has virtually no Germans in their social network and 1 indicates that nearly all their friends have a German background.

In Wave 1, parents and children answered the same set of questions about the ethnic composition of friendship networks, allowing for fine-grained assessments of the intergenerational transmission of majority ties. Between 2011 and 2022, youth respondents continued to answer these questions across nine measurement occasions, allowing the Germanness of social networks to be traced over an extended time horizon. In Wave 9, the CILS-DE introduced new items tapping respondents' political orientations, allowing for analyses that link majority ties to partisan preferences.

These features informed the modelling decisions described in greater detail below. In the first two stages of my analysis, the Germanness of youths' social networks is regressed on an interaction between the majority skew of parental networks in Wave 1 and a respondent's generational status. In the third stage of my analysis, when respondents are in their late-20s, the Germanness of social networks serves as the focal independent variable predicting respondents' political preferences; in this final stage, immigrant generation is once again included as a moderator to allow for heterogeneous patterns of association linking majority ties to partisan affinities.

Due to the wide range of options available to German partisans, I draw on two measures of respondents' political preferences in early adulthood: (i) a granular,



unadjusted eight-category measure of party preference; and (ii) a distilled, three-category nominal outcome indicating whether a respondent's preferred party is on Germany's parliamentary *left* (SPD, *Die Grünen*, *Die Linke*),<sup>3</sup> the parliamentary *right* (CDU/CSU, FDP, AfD),<sup>4</sup> or falls into a residual *other* category (inclusive of more marginal parties or abstention from voting altogether).

Why develop this latter, simplified outcome? The goal is to ease interpretation and cut through (simplify) the garden of forking paths (conditional associations) that emerge when each party in Germany is taken as a distinct and mutually exclusive destination for partisans. Indeed, Germany's political field is organised around a low-threshold, multiparty electoral system that produces chameleonic governing coalitions that can, in principle, bring disparate political actors and movements into a delicate unity. As a result, the voting preferences of ordinary Germans cannot be readily reduced to their "left-right" identities, as several German parties reside in similar regions of the high-dimensional issue space that underlies European politics of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century (see Abou-Chadi and Krause 2021)—or, to simplify further, the German *left* and *right* field multiple party representatives during any given election year. I return to this point in the latter portion of the section to follow.

## 6 Results

Below, I present my main results using a series of visualisations that summarise key descriptive patterns and highlight statistical quantities of interest (e.g., average marginal effects on a counterfactual grid; cf. Arel-Bundock, Greifer, and Heiss 2024). These visualisations are organised around the three empirical stages detailed in my foregoing discussion: one tracking the intergenerational reproduction of majority ties; another mapping the Germanness of respondents' social networks over time; and a third examining how the majority skew of respondents' networks is tied to political predilections. As these stages are introduced, I provide supplementary information about the models used to derive the key quantities discussed in the exposition.

<sup>3</sup> That is, the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens (*Die Grünen*), and the Left (*Die Linke*).

<sup>4</sup> The Christian Democrats (CSU in Bavaria, CDU in the rest of Germany); the Liberals (FDP); and the far right (AfD).




Figure 2: Estimates from local polynomial regressions linking the Germanness of parental networks in Wave 1 of the CILS-DE to the Germanness of adolescent networks during the same year. Confidence intervals reflect an  $\alpha$  of 0.05.

## 6.1 Stage 1: The Intergenerational Transmission of Majority Ties

Figure 2 provides a descriptive summary of the transmission of majority ties in Wave 1 of the CILS-DE. Concretely, this plot visualises smoothed conditional means (derived via local polynomial regressions) linking the Germanness of parental social networks in 2011 to the Germanness of adolescent networks during the same year. As the plot makes clear, the majority skew of parental networks is tightly associated with the Germanness of adolescents' ethnic ties in Wave 1 of the survey.

To assess whether this association withstands the inclusion of controls and the introduction of multiplicative interactions that allow for effect moderation, I turn to regression adjustment. Specifically, I estimate a weighted linear regression where the Germanness of a child's network in adolescence—the outcome of interest in the first stage of my analysis—is regressed on an interaction between the majority skew of their parent's social network and the youth respondent's generational status. Figure 3




Figure 3: The top row presents the average marginal effect (AME) of parental network “Germanness” on the Germanness of adolescents’ networks in Wave 1 of the CILS-DE, with separate estimates by immigrant generation. The bottom row plots adjusted predictions of adolescents’ network Germanness as a function of parental network Germanness across generations. Results are based on a weighted linear regression ( $n = 3470$ ) adjusting for religious affiliation, gender/sex, the immigrant share of respondents’ schools (discrete), and several parental characteristics: whether the surveyed parent was the mother or father, employment status, and possession of a university degree. Confidence intervals reflect an  $\alpha$  of 0.05.

charts the main results of this multivariate exercise. For a full list of the covariates included in the estimation process, please review the figure caption.

In Figure 3, the key parameter of intergenerational association—the average marginal effect (AME) of parents’ *network Germanness* on the Germanness of their child’s interpersonal network—is displayed in the top row, with a set of “dot-and-whiskers” summarising AMEs along generational fault-lines. The bottom row draws on a counterfactual grid (see Rohrer and Arel-Bundock 2025) to visualise the estimated Germanness of a child’s social network across the theoretical range of parental

network Germanness (0-1), with each column or panel probing *possible* variation by generational status.

Looking at the top row in Figure 3, a clear pattern comes into view: as the Germanness of parental networks rises, so too does the majority skew of adolescents' ethnic ties. This pattern is not meaningfully conditioned by immigrant generation, as intergenerational associations are uniformly positive and reach significance in all four generational subsamples. The model-based predictions visualised in the bottom row cast this relative *homogeneity* into sharp relief. For example, if we were to toggle the majority skew of parental networks from 0.2 to 0.8, the predicted Germanness of adolescent networks would rise from 0.61 to 0.71 among natives (a 16.9% increase) and from 0.47 to 0.63 among their first-generation peers (a 30.8% increase).

I test the robustness of these results in supplemental analyses. In *separate* model specifications, I add school fixed effects, use an adjusted Germanness index,<sup>5</sup> fit an ordered beta regression as opposed to a linear model (Kubinec 2023), treat missingness via multivariate imputation by chained equations (van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011), and—drawing on the insights of social mobility scholars—estimate a “rank-rank” regression (see Engzell and Mood 2023).<sup>6</sup> My results are substantively unchanged. Summaries of these supplementary exercises can be found in the [appendix](#).

## 6.2 Stage 2: Tracking How Majority Ties Evolve Over Time

Next, I test whether the Germanness of parental networks in Wave 1 of the survey is associated with the majority skew of their child's network during the transition to adulthood. To this end, I fit a multilevel growth model predicting how the Germanness of respondents' social worlds evolve from adolescence to their late-20s (from Waves 1 to 9 or 2011 to 2022). This model includes random intercepts at the individual and (Wave 1) school levels, as well as a random slope term for *time* (years) to allow growth trajectories to flexibly vary among respondents. As in Stage

<sup>5</sup> Where the Germanness index reflects a difference score between the self-reported share of ethnic Germans in a respondent's network vis-à-vis the *maximum* value for the other putative ethnic groups under consideration.

<sup>6</sup> That is, the percentile rank of network Germanness among adolescents (in the youth distribution) and parents (in the parental distribution) in Wave 1 of the CILS-DE.



Figure 4: The top row presents the AME of parental network Germanness on the Germanness of adolescents' networks at four distinct time points (columns), with separate estimates by immigrant generation. The middle and bottom rows highlight model-based predictions of adolescents' network Germanness as a function of parental network Germanness (i) across immigrant generations; and (ii) at two distinct time points (around Ages 19 and 27). Results are based on a multilevel growth model ( $n = 20,463$ ) with random intercepts at the individual and (Wave 1) school levels and random slopes for time. Model adjusts for religious affiliation, gender/sex, and several parental attributes from Wave 1: whether the surveyed parent was the mother or father, their employment status, and whether they held a university degree. Confidence intervals reflect an  $\alpha$  of 0.05.

1, key regressors on the right-hand side include the Germanness of parental networks (as measured in Wave 1) and a respondent's generational status—two time-invariant indicators that are, in conjunction with my time index, ensnared in a three-way, cross-level interaction. My analytic model uses the calibrated weights prepared by Kalter, Kogan, and Dollmann (2019) to account for panel attrition and design factors.

Figure 4 presents key quantities derived from this multilevel model, with covariates listed in the figure caption. Once again, my parameter of intergenerational

association—the AME of parents’ network Germanness on the majority skew of their child’s interpersonal network—is highlighted in the top row, with dots and whiskers summarising AMEs by generation, and panels (columns) probing whether these intergenerational patterns substantively shift as respondents move from age 19 (first column) to 27 (last column). The middle and bottom rows of Figure 4 visualise predicted values of respondents’ network Germanness across the theoretical range of parental network Germanness at two distinct time points—around ages 19 (middle row) and 27 (bottom row)—with each column illustrating marginalised predictions across generational subsamples.

Overall, the figure highlights moments of convergence and heterogeneity. Across all generational subsamples, intergenerational associations (top row) are positive and *tend to be* statistically significant in late adolescence and the early 20s, consistent with the cross-sectional evidence adduced in Stage 1. As the results visualised in the middle row show, this corresponds to an intuitive pattern of predictions: if we toggle the Germanness of parental networks from low to high, predicted values for respondents’ network Germanness rise in late adolescence and the early 20s. However, as respondents reach their late 20s, estimated patterns begin to diverge along generational lines. Among the two largest generational subsamples (Natives and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation), AMEs of interest remain virtually unchanged, although confidence intervals widen slightly with time. For the other subsamples (1<sup>st</sup> Generation and Above 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation), AMEs gradually move toward zero during early adulthood, and associated confidence intervals clearly signal non-significance, resulting in predicted levels of network Germanness that are relatively flat across the full range of parental network Germanness (bottom row).

To assess the robustness of these results, I conduct a series of checks detailed in the [appendix](#), similar in form to those used to gauge the robustness of the patterns presented in Stage 1. Results remain largely unchanged, except for one supplementary exercise worth noting here. In brief, I show that treating immigrant status as a binary indicator (native vis-à-vis immigrant-origin) in the growth model yields a more uniform pattern where intergenerational associations for both native and immigrant-origin respondents are positive and easily reach significance over time. Whether this apparent “convergence” is driven by compositional dynamics (e.g., the outsized influence of second-generation respondents), or by differential rates of attrition and

related sample-size considerations (producing the non-significant patterns described above) remains unclear. Even so, my most consistent finding is that, regardless of generational status, parental influences on the Germanness of respondents' networks persist into late adolescence—a time when cultural and political orientations cohere and stabilise (cf., Kiley and Vaisey 2020). This affirms the robustness of the intergenerational patterns presented in Stage 1 under a particularly stringent test of transmission, one that tracks whether parents' majority ties in 2011 shape the composition of children's social worlds more than a decade later.

### 6.3 Stage 3: Majority Ties and Political Preferences

The first two stages have shown that, at minimum, robust intergenerational associations link parents' majority ties to the native concentration of adolescents' social networks—broadly in line with expectations. In Stage 3, I consider whether the Germanness of respondents' adult networks is associated with their political preferences, with different patterns expected by generational status. To evaluate these expectations, I estimate two weighted multinomial logistic regressions: one predicting party preferences using a granular, unadjusted measure as the outcome; and another using the distilled, three-category (*left*, *right*, *other*) measure described previously. In both models, I regress political preferences on an interaction between the Germanness of respondents' networks and generational status, allowing both variables to jointly influence partisan sensibilities. Moreover, both models include *all* respondents in the sample, not only those whose parents were interviewed in Wave 1 of the survey. This ensures that any unobserved selection effects undergirding parental participation in 2011 cannot explain the patterns discussed below. Supplementary exercises (see the [appendix](#)) confirm that these patterns are robust to alternative model specifications.

Before presenting model results, I turn to Figure 5 to provide descriptive context. The figure highlights unadjusted patterns of party support along generational lines. Among the young Germans in my sample (about 26–27 years old in 2022), *Die Grünen* was the party of choice for a plurality of natives and respondents in the Above 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation category a year after the 2021 federal election. Among their first- and second-generation peers, patterns were more varied, with a substantial share reporting that they would support marginal parties “if a federal election were held next Sunday.”




Figure 5: Weighted shares of party support by generational status—based on the granular, unadjusted indicator of political preferences. Results only account for valid (non-missing) responses. Proportions are rounded. Consequently, row-wise totals may not sum to 1.0.

Figures 6 and 7 summarise whether, and how, these patterns shift after regression adjustment. Concretely, Figure 6 charts predicted probabilities of party support—measured using the granular, eight-category indicator—along generational lines, with covariates described in the figure caption. The three panels highlight model-based predictions at three distinct levels of network Germanness: 0 (lower bound), 0.5 (scalar midpoint), and 1 (upper bound). There are, of course, a constellation of regression-adjusted estimates visualised—too many to reasonably summarise here. However, some patterns are worth underscoring.

Imagine a counterfactual setting where the majority skew of a respondent's network is set to 0. In this setting, natives would be expected to rally behind the SPD and *Die Linke*, while second-generation respondents would, in expectation, gravitate towards the far-right AfD or more marginal parties. Now, let us consider a counterfactual world where the Germanness of respondents' networks is set to 1. In this world, a plurality of native respondents would, in expectation, support the left-leaning *Die Grünen*, but a larger share would shift allegiances to right-leaning parties like the CDU/CSU and the FDP. Among second-generation respondents, we see the






Figure 6: Predicted probabilities of political preferences by generational status, with the three panels visualising grids of predictions at three levels of network Germanness (0, 0.5, 1). Results are based on a weighted multinomial regression ( $n = 3032$ ) predicting party support (granular). The model adjusts for religious affiliation, gender or sex, age, and occupation. Probabilities are rounded. Consequently, row-wise totals may not sum to 1.0.

opposite pattern, as more than half would be expected to throw their support behind left-leaning parliamentary parties (*Die Grünen*, *Die Linke*, SPD).

The array of predictions in Figure 6 highlights a point foreshadowed earlier: the fragmented nature of Germany's political field can lead to a labyrinthine web of causal




Figure 7: The top row presents the AME of respondents' majority ties in Wave 9 on preferences for parliamentary parties on the political left or right, or for "other" parties and political outcomes (including abstention). The bottom row shows adjusted predictions of preferring *left*, *right*, or *other* parties/outcomes across the distribution of network Germanness. Columns highlight generational differences. Results are based on a weighted multinomial regression ( $n = 3032$ ) predicting party support, adjusting for religious affiliation, gender or sex, age, and occupation. Confidence intervals reflect an  $\alpha$  of 0.05.

processes linking voters to parties. Consequently, one should not conclude that the majority concentration of networks plays a *deterministic* role in constraining political sensibilities. However, as the patterns visualised in the figure make clear, relational processes are still deeply consequential. To make this point more legible, I turn to Figure 7, which presents results associated with my second multinomial model. Once again, covariates are detailed in the figure caption.

In this final model, the target variable is distilled to three broad categories of political preference. The top row of Figure 7 summarises the association between

respondents' majority-group ties in early adulthood and their political sensibilities, while the bottom row visualises predicted probabilities of supporting parties on the parliamentary *left* or *right*—or sorting into the tertiary *other* category (i.e., supporting marginal parties or abstention)—across the distribution of network Germanness. Each column in Figure 7 highlights patterns across generational lines. Both rows tell a similar story. As the majority skew of respondents' networks rises, native respondents become significantly less likely to support parties on the political left and more likely to support those on the right. Among first- and second-generation respondents, the pattern is broadly reversed: as the Germanness of their networks rise, they become more inclined to support parties on the left and less likely to support those on the right, although this latter association only reaches significance among the first-generation. For respondents assigned to the Above 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation category, patterns are less clear-cut. This *broadly* aligns with expectations, as sharp differences along the native, non-native divide were predicted to fade across successive immigrant generations.

## 7 Conclusion

### 7.1 Summary and Implications

In this study, I explored an underappreciated catalyst for political socialisation in immigrant societies: the intergenerational transmission of majority-group ties. Using survey data from the CILS-DE (the German leg of the CILS4EU), my analyses unfolded in three key stages. In Stage 1, I drew on dyadic, parent-adolescent data to confirm that the Germanness of youth respondents' interpersonal networks is strongly associated with the majority skew of their parents' social ties. In Stage 2, drawing on the panel component of the CILS-DE, I documented how these social inheritances (i.e., intergenerational associations) can be detected years into the future, although subtle differences emerge in early adulthood as a function of immigrant generation. In Stage 3, using data from Wave 9 of the CILS-DE, I adjudicated whether majority ties are linked to political preferences. Consistent with theoretical expectations, associative patterns vary sharply by migration background: for native Germans, majority-centric networks correspond with more support for right-leaning parties and less support for

parties on the parliamentary left, while the opposite pattern emerges for *most* of their immigrant-origin peers.

To the extent that these results are applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to other immigrant societies in Europe and beyond, they carry important implications for our understanding of cleavage politics and the political incorporation of immigrants and their descendants. In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, the politics of immigration have moved to the heart of the political field, as exemplified by the rising tide of far-right parties and movements that have “owned” the immigration issue, as well as the normalisation and mainstreaming of far-right ideas, discourses, and frames steeped in anti-foreigner sentiment (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020; Mudde 2019; Valentim 2024). Against this backdrop, the nativeness of our social ties is a diacritical marker of our political commitments. Among natives, a larger share of majority-group ties is associated with more conservative or right-leaning networks; among most immigrant-origin people, a larger share of majority ties is associated with networks that skew left. Therefore, the nativeness of our ties serves as a robust proxy for the political composition of our social worlds *conditional* on our migration backgrounds. This suggests that parental influences on the ethnic composition of their offspring’s social networks (whether direct or indirect) should be understood as a form of *political* socialisation.

Why might majority-group ties acquire a political charge in the first place? As noted, at least two interrelated mechanisms are at play. First, immigration has been increasingly tied to progressive parties and causes in mainstream political culture, creating latent incentives to bring the *ethnic* composition of interpersonal networks into alignment with our political self-understandings. Second, and relatedly, variation in the boundary-making strategies individuals pursue to manage diversity can produce and reinforce divergent orientations towards cultural preservation or change—shaping who we befriend and the political parties we support.

As my results suggest, these mechanisms can lead to different outcomes as a function of one’s migration background. In the postwar era, immigration has become increasingly tied to a diffuse web of social groups (e.g., sexual minorities, the higher educated, younger cohorts) and progressive ideological dimensions (e.g., feminism, environmentalism, multiculturalism) in mainstream understandings of the political cleavage structure (see Figure 1)—implicit understandings that most natives have likely encoded. Thus, majority-skewed networks should align with conservatism and

boundary *contraction* among natives, reinforcing traditionalist sensibilities oriented towards cultural preservation and heightening the propensity to support parties on the right. Conversely, less majority-skewed networks should be aligned with forms of boundary *expansion* or *blurring* that signal an affinity for cultural evolution through the rearticulation of national boundaries, increasing the propensity to support left-leaning parties and progressive movements.

The same twinned mechanisms are relevant for immigrant-origin people; however, how they culminate in political preferences is broadly reversed. Rather than signalling boundary *contraction* or conservatism, more majority-skewed networks reflect structural assimilation and boundary *expansion*, *blurring* or *crossing* for immigrants and their descendants. Consequently, majority ties are likely to increase exposure to progressive natives (e.g., ethnic majorities engaged in boundary expansion) and a mainstream political culture that connects immigration to progressive ideological frameworks and allied social groups. In line with this interpretation, results suggest that—on balance—immigrant-origin people with more majority-skewed networks evince a heightened propensity to support left-leaning political parties. Conversely, less majority-skewed networks reflect *ethnic enclosure* and boundary *contraction* among immigrant-origin people, as well as their embeddedness in social worlds populated by conservative co-ethnics and heterodox visions of political space at variance with mainstream political culture. This should, in principle, yield lower levels of support for left-leaning parties and more support for right-wing alternatives—consistent with the regression results presented in this study.

## 7.2 Limitations and Future Directions

There are, of course, limitations with this study that future research should systematically address. These limitations take two main forms. The first concerns population heterogeneity and theoretical generalisability, while the second concerns the role of *culture* in the network formation processes foregrounded in this paper. Below, I briefly discuss these concerns in turn.

At its core, this study provides a broad empirical test of how the *majority skew* of social networks is implicated in the political socialisation process. In advancing this high-level assessment, however, the varieties of network configurations and forms

that can crystallise in immigrant societies—say, at the intersections of ethnicity, religion and gender (e.g., Kroneberg, Kruse, and Wimmer 2021)—are elided by design. More fine-grained analyses of how heterogeneous network configurations are forged, how these networks are transmitted within households, and how they relate to distal political outcomes can help us derive more precise scope conditions for the theoretical propositions sketched in this paper. In a similar vein, future research should adjudicate whether the patterns reported here “travel” to, or are broadly detectable in, other national contexts within and beyond Europe—or whether there are contextual contingencies and heterogeneities that warrant further theorisation.

Moreover, while *culture* plays a key role in the theoretical framework presented in this study, important questions about the relationship between cultural socialisation, belief formation, and network composition remain somewhat underexplored. To the extent that our cultural orientations structure the social ties we form (and not the other way around; see Lizardo 2006; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010), the transmission of cultural beliefs within families may powerfully shape the majority skew of our social worlds *independent* of our parents’ ethnic ties. Analysing these possibilities, and fleshing out their theoretical implications, is an important task for future research exploring the intergenerational transmission of majority-group ties and their political consequences.

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# Supplementary Appendix

## Stage 1 Descriptives and Robustness Checks

Table A1: Summary Statistics

	<i>Mean or Share</i>
<i>Majority Ties (Child)</i>	
Network Germanness (0-1)	0.74 ( $\sigma = 0.15$ )
<i>Majority Ties (Parent)</i>	
Network Germanness (0-1)	0.76 ( $\sigma = 0.16$ )
<i>Immigrant Generation</i>	
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	5.71%
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	20.24%
Above 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	13.43%
Native	60.63%
<i>Religious Affiliation</i>	
Protestant	39.19%
Catholic	34.17%
Islam	7.94%
No Affiliation	15.74%
Other	2.95%
<i>Sex or Gender</i>	
Male	50.76%
Female	49.24%
<i>School Context</i>	
0-10% Immigrants	51.82%
10-30% Immigrants	33.52%
30-60% Immigrants	11.14%
60-100% Immigrants	3.53%
<i>Parent's University Status</i>	
Did Not Complete University	81.57%
Completed University	16.81%
Missing	1.62%
<i>Parent's Relation to Child</i>	
Father	21.21%
Mother	78.79%
<i>Parent's Employment Status</i>	
Unemployed	19.22%
Employed	79.77%
Missing	1.01%



Figure A1: Robustness checks for Stage 1 results. Each panel shows the intergenerational transmission of majority ties by generation. Within panels, the first estimate (“Main”) on the y-axis reports the AME from the main specification; subsequent rows present estimates from alternative model specifications. As noted in the main text, the *adjusted Germanness index* is a difference score between the self-reported share of ethnic Germans in a respondent’s network and the maximum score for any other (putative) ethnic group under evaluation.



## Stage 2 Descriptives and Robustness Checks

Table A2: *Pooled* Summary Statistics

	<i>Mean or Share</i>
<i>Majority Ties (Child)</i>	
Network Germanness (0-1)	0.74 ( $\sigma = 0.15$ )
<i>Majority Ties (Parent)</i>	
Network Germanness (0-1)	0.77 ( $\sigma = 0.16$ )
<i>Immigrant Generation</i>	
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	5.99%
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	19.84%
Above 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	13.09%
Native	61.07%
<i>Religious Affiliation</i>	
Protestant	34.14%
Catholic	31.55%
Islam	8.84%
No Affiliation	21.52%
Other	3.95%
<i>Sex or Gender</i>	
Male	48.87%
Female	51.13%
<i>Parent's University Status</i>	
Did Not Complete University	81.65%
Completed University	16.71%
Missing	1.65%
<i>Parent's Relation to Child</i>	
Father	21.31%
Mother	78.69%
<i>Parent's Employment Status</i>	
Unemployed	19.35%
Employed	79.77%
Missing	0.88%




Figure A2: Robustness checks for Stage 2 results. Columns show intergenerational associations in Germanness at four distinct time points. The “Main” row visualises AMEs from the baseline specification; subsequent rows present alternative specifications. Within each row or panel, dots and whiskers show estimates by immigrant generation.

### Stage 3 Descriptives and Robustness Checks

Table A3: Summary Statistics

	<i>Mean or Share</i>
<i>Majority Ties</i>	
Network Germanness (0-1)	0.75 ( $\sigma = 0.15$ )
<i>Immigrant Generation</i>	
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	5.40%
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	17.82%
Above 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	12.42%
Native	64.36%
<i>Age in Years</i>	
Age	26.79 ( $\sigma = 0.77$ )
<i>Religious Affiliation</i>	
Protestant	27.99%
Catholic	28.56%
Christian (Other)	2.49%
Islam	7.59%
No Affiliation	31.91%
Other	1.46%
<i>Sex or Gender</i>	
Male	45.40%
Female	54.60%
<i>Occupational Status</i>	
Full-Time/Part-Time Job	64.33%
Studying or School	20.52%
Apprenticeship, Training/Internship	6.25%
Unemployed	3.45%
Something Else	5.44%



Figure A3: Select robustness checks for Stage 3 results associated with the eight-category outcome measure tapping partisan preferences. Scatterplots show correlations between predicted probabilities from the main specification ( $x$ -axis) and corresponding predictions from models using (i) the *adjusted Germanness index* and (ii) multiple imputation via chained equations ( $y$ -axis). Bar plots show the share of test statistic values derived from these alternative specifications that align (at an  $\alpha$  of 0.05) with estimates underlying main results.



Figure A4: Robustness checks for Stage 3 results associated with the three-category outcome tapping partisan preferences. Columns highlight the association between majority ties and partisan preferences for left-leaning, right-leaning, or “other” parties. The “Main” row visualises AMEs from the baseline specification; subsequent rows present alternative specifications. Within each row or panel, dots and whiskers show estimates by immigrant generation.