
Islam and the Transmission of Cultural Identity in Four European Countries*

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Studies exploring the integration of European immigrants tend to find cultural gaps between Muslim children and their peers. While some scholars argue that parent-to-child transmission is a key mechanism underlying this pattern, others privilege extrafamilial explanations by pointing to differences in cultural values within Muslim households. In the present study, I argue that these mixed results stem from a tendency in the literature to analyze distinct components of personal culture in isolation from cognate dimensions. To address this shortcoming, I use multigroup latent class models to explore how a wide range of attitudes (tapping ethnocultural identity, gender norms, sexual liberalism, and perspectives on integration) are clustered together in disparate regions of the belief space, marking distinct cultural identities. Then, I fit a series of logistic regressions to map how these cultural identities are distributed among immigrant-origin samples in four European countries and transmitted across generational lines. Ultimately, I arrive at the following conclusion: while Muslim youth stand out from their peers *vis-à-vis* their cultural identity profiles, there is little evidence to suggest that this pattern is *decisively* shaped by parent-to-child transmission.

Keywords: Cultural Integration, Intergenerational Transmission, Muslims in Europe.

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I Introduction

In recent decades, the integration of Muslim immigrants has been hotly debated by European politicians, academics and commentators (Foner 2015; Modood 2003; Yazdih 2019). The trajectories and lived experiences of Muslim children have been central to these debates. Whether born or raised in Europe, the children of Muslim immigrants should, pursuant to the predictions of straight-line assimilation theory (Gordon 1964), adopt cultural identities in line with the liberalism and secularism that pervade public institutions in countries like England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden — the four host societies featured in the present study. A voluminous literature on integration patterns in Europe suggests that this has not transpired. Instead, scholars tend to report that Muslim youth “stand out” from their peers due to the intensity of their religious beliefs as well as their traditional value systems (Bisin et al. 2008; Drouhot 2021; Drouhot and Nee 2019).

What explains this cultural distance? In their review of the literature, Drouhot and Nee (2019) point to two key mechanisms. First, discrimination from natives—and repeated exposures to cultural templates, frames and schemas that reaffirm their distinctiveness—may lead Muslim children to drift away from greater society and adopt values that mirror their parents’ beliefs or are even farther removed from the ideals promoted by mainstream institutions (Fleischmann, Phaet, and Klein 2011; Maliepaard and Alba 2016; Wimmer and Soehl 2014). Second, Muslim parents may be much more likely or inclined to transmit cultural values to their children *vis-à-vis* parents in other faith communities, thereby preserving cultural gaps between Muslims and the so-called mainstream over time (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Jacob and Kalter 2013; Soehl 2017).

In the current study, I spotlight the second (intrafamilial) mechanism and challenge two of its key assumptions: (i) that parent-to-child cultural transmission is *especially* common within European Muslim households and (ii) that the cultural distance between Muslim youth and their peers can be *directly* explained by intergenerational transfers. Specifically, I argue that these assumptions are only valid if we reduce personal culture, or the breadth of cultural knowledge encoded within individuals (Lizardo 2017), to single issue domains or attitudinal dimensions (e.g., subjective religiosity). As I detail in the sections to follow, unidimensional analyses of attitudes can offer valuable, fine-grained insights about the social world but are ill-equipped to capture *broad* cultural affinities or disaffinities between individuals—and so, may be obscuring the cultural differences that distinguish Muslim parents from their daughters and sons.

An example can help clarify this point. Consider the cultural profiles displayed in Figure 1. These profiles belong to a Muslim parent and three of their children. In the stylized example, each profile represents a set of cultural beliefs tapping an individual’s religious attachments, ethnic attachments, national attachments, gender norms and attitudes towards sexual liberalism. Analytically, if we *only* homed-in on the transmission of religious attachments, we might conclude that Parent A successfully




Figure 1: Stylized example of cultural differences across generational lines.

transmitted their cultural beliefs to Child 1 and Child 2. Similarly, if we *only* analyzed the transmission of gender norms, we might assume that Parent A successfully transmitted their cultural beliefs to Child 2 and Child 3.

However, a broader treatment of cultural identity should lead to a much different conclusion: once multiple dimensions of personal culture are brought into view, Child 2 emerges as the only sibling featured in the bottom panel of Figure 1 whose cultural beliefs map onto Parent A's.

In line with this broad treatment of individual-level culture, the present study shifts focus away from responses to specific survey items or issue domains and towards multidimensional profiles of cultural identity. To do so, it draws heavily from the wells of cognitive and cultural sociology as well




Figure 2: Theoretical conceptualization of cultural transmission in a high-dimensional space — here, flattened to two dimensions to ease interpretation. As the plot suggests, cultural transmission can be unsuccessful *even if* parents and children report similar scores on a single dimension of personal culture (e.g., subjective religiosity). Put another way, analyzing multiple attitudinal dimensions is necessary to (i) extract an individual’s coordinates (or item-response values) in a belief space; (ii) determine respondents’ cultural sensibilities by locating them within specific regions or clusters in this space; and (iii) make concrete evaluations about the intergenerational transmission of cultural identity, or whether parents and children share similar (i.e., membership in the same cultural subsample) or dissimilar (i.e., membership in different cultural subsamples) beliefs about the world.

as cognate bodies of scholarship exploring the structure of, or interrelationships between, attitudes and item-responses (Boutyline and Vaisey 2017; Brandt, Sibley, and Osborne 2019). Studies emanating from this interdisciplinary literature posit that our attitudes about the world are not “held in isolation” from one another (DellaPosta 2020; Karim 2024). Instead, attitudes come packaged or bundled together and naturally co-occur within individuals due, in part, to associative forms of social learning and patterned social exposures over the life course (see Boutyline and Soter 2021).

Consequently, the clustering of attitudes within individuals carries a clear *cultural* signature. So-called “latte liberals” and “bird-hunting conservatives,” for instance, display distinct patterns of beliefs and predilections that are socially acquired (DellaPosta, Shi, and Macy 2015). This sort of cultural clustering (*within* and *across* individuals) is a common, if not characteristic, feature of modern societies

(Goldberg and Stein 2018) and can be detected in social survey data. More formally, if we imagine item-responses as coordinates within a latent *belief space* (with as many dimensions as measures; cf. Van Gunten, Martin, and Teplitskiy 2016), we should find clusters of individuals, bounded by different cultural identities or item-response patterns, located in disparate regions of this semantic expanse.

In the current study, I use this insight to conceptualize and measure cultural transmission within immigrant households and evaluate the cultural retention thesis: i.e., the idea that young European Muslims' cultural heterodoxy stems from parent-to-child cultural transfers. Concretely, I posit that cultural transmission is *successful* if a parent and child are clustered together in similar regions of a belief space and *unsuccessful* if they are located in different regions or embedded in different cultural subsamples (see Figure 2). This framework accounts for two forms of clustering that unidimensional treatments of cultural transmission generally mask: the clustering of *attitudes* into belief structures within people; and correspondingly, the clustering of *individuals* into cultural communities due to the disparate sociocultural traditions and belief structures that pervade greater society (DiMaggio et al. 2018).

Empirically, I draw on dyadic, parent-adolescent data from four European countries, latent class models, and a battery of regressions to adjudicate my propositions. Ultimately, I find scant evidence to support the claim that intergenerational transmission *drives* cultural differences between Muslim adolescents and their immigrant-origin peers. Overall, these results challenge the cultural retention thesis. Compared to transmission within families, forces exogenous to the family unit—such as the social closure wrought by discrimination or Islamic revivalism (Becker 2021; Wimmer and Soehl 2014)—appear to be more proximately associated with the cultural identities of Muslim children.

2 Cultural Transmission Among European Muslims

A large body of quantitative research suggests that parent-to-child transmission drives cultural heterogeneity among immigrant-origin youth in Europe (Jacob and Kalter 2013; Maliepaard, Gijsberts, and Lubbers 2012; Sánchez Guerrero, Schober, and Vleuten 2023). As the story goes, over time and across generations, immigrant parents who are more able or inclined to pass their values, beliefs and attachments to their children will decelerate the process of acculturation for their daughters and sons (i.e., the acquisition of cultural identities aligned with the public culture of mainstream institutions), an outcome strongly patterned by religious affiliation (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2018; Soehl 2017). Specifically, scholars have argued that cultural transfers within households can, in conjunction with discrimination, explain why young European Muslims stand out from their peers in cultural affairs (Drouhot and Nee 2019).

To support this argument, researchers have often pointed to the resilience of religiosity within Muslim households in Europe and have linked this resilience—and the enduring presence of Islam in the

region—to cultural transmission chains. Survey-based studies in Germany (Jacob 2020), France (Soehl 2017), the Netherlands (Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013) and beyond (e.g., de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014) show that Muslim parents routinely transmit their religious beliefs and identities to their children and do so at a rate that far exceeds that of their non-Muslim peers.

While less common, survey-based analyses on other beliefs or aspects of cultural transmission have yielded similar conclusions. Recent studies have, for instance, drawn on disproportionately-Muslim samples in Germany to posit that the conservative gender role attitudes of immigrant-origin children are intimately shaped by parental transmission (Kretschmer 2018) and that ethnic attachments have persisted across generational lines (Casey and Dustmann 2010). Similarly, some cross-national studies report robust associations between Islam and anti-abortion attitudes that survive generational controls (implying cultural continuity; see Carol and Milewski 2018), while others highlight the durability of norms promoting endogamy within European Muslim communities (Carol 2016). Deviating from these patterns, Maliepaard and Alba (2016) find that a majority of Muslim youth in the Netherlands encode gender role attitudes that are more egalitarian than those of their parents; still, large minorities of Dutch Muslim youth appear to be *as* traditional as—or *more* conservative than—their parents with respect to gender ideology.

Taken together, these results map onto the idea that cultural reproduction within Muslim households, driven by cultural transmission across generational lines, animates the heterodox beliefs of Muslim youth. As noted previously, the prospect of cultural stability across immigrant generations is at odds with canonical, straight-line assimilation theory and its teleology of ethnocultural decay (Gordon 1964). Cultural persistence is, however, eminently compatible with the *segmented assimilation* perspective (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). For the theory's proponents, assimilation is not understood as a straight line, but as a series of forking paths that funnel immigrants into disparate segments of the host society, from the so-called mainstream to the subaltern periphery. In adopting this framework, Maliepaard and Alba (2016: 73) posit that cultural reproduction within parent-child dyads signals a *pluralist* path to incorporation — i.e., where cultural orientations remain relatively stable across immigrant generations due, in part, to “the attractiveness of the ethnic community and its culture” for the children of immigrants.

While the image of a “pluralist trajectory” is consistent with the quantitative literature summarized above, a smaller set of ethnographic and interview-based studies on Muslim immigrants in France (Saint-Blancat 2004), England (Jacobson 1997), Norway (Jacobsen 2010) and beyond (Vertovec and Rogers 1998) offer an alternative view. Contra the narrative of intergenerational persistence, this research highlights *cultural discontinuities* within European Muslim households. According to these studies, while the Islam practiced by the parental generation is often enmeshed with the trappings and diacritics of the ancestral homeland, many young Muslims gravitate towards *scripturalist* forms of Islam that, in their view, are more universally oriented than the parochialized Islam endorsed by their parents (Becker 2021;

Cesari 2002; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). In lieu of cultural resilience or stability, these studies paint a portrait of intergenerational rupture — of young Muslims adopting cultural identities at variance with the views of their parents.

This empirical portrait is consistent with another stylized path to assimilation: *reactive ethnicity*, or the hardening of ethnocultural attachments across immigrant generations. For European Muslims, reactive ethnicity is marked by intergenerational movement through the belief space towards heightened traditionalism or heterodoxy, a process galvanized by “encounters with prejudice and discrimination that stimulate a reactive and defiant assertion of ethnic difference” (Maliepaard and Alba 2016: 73). In much of Europe, Muslims confront rigid symbolic boundaries that are bright and difficult to penetrate (Alba 2005; Foner 2015) — even via traditional channels to acculturative inclusion (e.g., upward socioeconomic mobility; see Beaman 2015, 2016). Moreover, European Muslims routinely encounter *civilizational* discourses and frames that position their faith community against the broader enterprise of European liberalism (Brubaker 2017). Therefore, to the extent that young Muslims valorize ethnocultural difference, it may represent a rejection of “the indignity and inequity imbued by partial inclusion in European nation-states through the knowledge and practice of Islam” (Becker 2021: 17).

In sum, a burgeoning survey-based research program suggests that parent-to-child transmission catalyzes the heterodox beliefs of young European Muslims. Conversely, a smaller set of studies based on interviews and ethnographies finds that European Muslim households are defined by generational schisms and cultural disjunctures. Despite the many virtues of these literatures, there are reasons to be skeptical of both sets of conclusions. First, despite providing multidimensional portraits of respondents’ cultural dispositions, studies emanating from the latter, qualitatively oriented literature may not capture population-level trends or patterns. Second, despite adducing a wealth of population-level insights, studies emerging from the former, survey-based literature tend to examine single issue domains or attitudinal dimensions; thus, it is unclear whether population-level patterns of cultural resilience will hold when multiple cultural dimensions are brought into the analytic horizon. In the section to follow, I clarify why a multidimensional treatment of cultural identity is required to resolve these uncertainties and robustly assess the “cultural retention” thesis using population-level data — and more generally, to evaluate whether two individuals (such as a parent and child) share similar cultural sensibilities.

3 Latent Cultural Identities

Imagine a father (Adel) and daughter (Amina) who live near the outskirts of Paris. Both Amina and Adel view themselves as devout Muslims, but their understandings of the social world differ in meaningful ways. Adel is a conservative who remains symbolically tethered the heritage society: i.e., he endorses “traditional family values” and expresses low levels of affect for France. Conversely, Amina

is a feminist who privately indulges in Islamic mysticism while consecrating Republican values. When presented with a battery of survey items about the importance of religion, both Amina and Adel display similar item-response profiles and are, on account of their factor scores, similarly positioned along a latent distribution of subjective religiosity. Still, their *cultural identities*—and beliefs about the world at large—are not aligned, and cultural transmission has not been achieved. This example illustrates a simple point: analyzing attitudinal dimensions in silos can mask broader patterns of cultural affinity and disaffinity between individuals — patterns that qualitative analyses are naturally sensitive to. In the current study, I develop a measure of personal culture sensitized to cultural similarities between individuals in high-dimensional space.

Specifically, I develop a measure of *cultural identity*: an aggregation of the socially acquired beliefs, attachments and preferences that inform our “intuitions about ‘the kind of people we are’ ” (Vaisey 2009: 1707). These identities may be understood as *latent*, dispositional phenomena or forms of nondeclarative culture built up out of “implicit, durable, cognitive-emotive associations” and patterned social exposures (Lizardo 2017: 92). Although they operate beneath the threshold of consciousness, cultural identities are socially shared. In the context of surveys, we can detect these identities by mapping how respondents are (via their item-responses) dispersed within an N -dimensional belief space — with N corresponding to the number of survey items under evaluation. Given the schematizing effects of institutions and other objectified forms of public culture (Lizardo and Strand 2010), we should not expect a stochastic distribution of respondents within this space (what we might observe in an atomized world without culture), but rather a *clustering* of individuals in various subspaces or semantic regions.

This clustering is downstream from, or a marker of, the latent *cultural identities* that constrain item-responses in surveys and our beliefs about the world more broadly (cf. Goldberg and Stein 2018). Individuals who encode the same cultural identity belong to the same cognitive subculture or “thought community” (Zerubavel 2009) — a tacit form of cultural membership that is difficult, if not impossible, to detect in survey data without analyzing item-responses across several substantive dimensions (see DiMaggio et al. 2018).

Crucially, these thought communities should not be mistaken for *social* communities: while the former mark individuals who inhabit similar regions of a latent *semantic* space (or share similar cultural sensibilities), the latter mark individuals who are assigned to broad social categories and may reside in similar geographic regions or rungs of the structural hierarchy.¹ Similarly, cultural identity (as defined here) should not be mistaken for *social* identity: while social identities come to life via categorization processes and intergroup dynamics (Brewer 1999), individuals who encode the same cultural identity will, in most cases, not *consciously recognize* (or forge affective ties to) members of their symbolic ingroup or develop antipathies towards symbolic others. In essence, cultural identities are akin to what Brubaker and

¹ Thus, even individuals who live in different parts of the world can acquire similar cultural dispositions (Soehl and Karim 2021).

Cooper (2000: 17–18) call *self-understandings*: i.e., they are “dispositional” phenomena that can shape behavior “without themselves being discursively articulated.”

Individuals acquire cultural identities through the patterned social exposures (via family, schools *etc.*) that constitute lived experience. Consistent with recent research on cultural evolution (Kiley and Vaisey 2020), I assume that these identities are slow to change. However, change is certainly possible (Lersch 2023). A student raised in the South may, for instance, shed her commitments to moral orthodoxy as she attends university in the Northeast and is exposed to the liberalizing currents of higher education (Bročić and Miles 2021). This discrete shift in cultural identity should correspond with movement through the belief space to a *new* region or community of thought; the student does not, however, need to be consciously aware of these changes. In many respects, this model of slow-moving, unconscious cultural change reflects how Park and Burgess ([1921] 1969) conceptualized assimilation over a century ago.

In the analysis to follow, I attempt to retrieve cultural identities from survey data using a modest set of 16 indicators — representing the universe of items presented to *both* parents and children (and equivalent across countries) in the data source described below. While not exhaustive,² these items span four politically-charged dimensions of personal culture—ethnic attachments, attitudes towards sexual liberalism, gender norms, and beliefs about integration—that undergird anxieties over the cultural heterodoxy of immigrants in Europe (Andreassen and Lettinga 2011; Berggren, Ljunge, and Nilsson 2019; El-Tayeb 2012; Güngör et al. 2013). Moreover, these dimensions are routinely implicated in discourses that position European mass opinion—and the secularized Christian-liberal edifice that sustains it—against the alleged illiberalism of Islam (Brubaker 2017; Helbling and Traunmüller 2020).

Analytically, I use latent class models to find clusters of respondents, bounded by distinct cultural identities and item-response patterns, in the 16-dimensional belief space associated with these four dimensions. I define cultural transmission as *successful* if parents and children are assigned to the same cluster and unsuccessful if they are embedded in different cultural subsamples. Broadly speaking, my analysis can arrive at one of three major conclusions. First, it can support the cultural retention thesis described in the foregoing discussion by confirming that Muslim youth stand out from their peers due to intergenerational transfers (reflecting a *pluralist* path to incorporation). Second, it can upend current understandings in the literature by revealing that cultural differences between Muslim youth and their peers is overstated. Third, it can confirm that Muslim youth stand out from their classmates while *failing* to find that parent-to-child transfers drive this pattern (signaling *reactive ethnicity*). I consider each of these possibilities below.

² Moreover, as (Martin 2002) suggests, studying *samples* of beliefs is often merited (and empirically warranted) given the vast array of attitudes that individuals can theoretically adopt.

Table 1: Indicator Variables

Dimension	Indicator	Definition	Range or Category
Ethnic Attachments	Host	How strongly do you feel like you're a [<i>host nationality</i>]?	1 to 4 (<i>not at all</i> to <i>very strongly/important</i>)
	Religion	How important is religion to you?	
	Origin	How strongly do you feel like you belong to [<i>origin community</i>]?	
	Customs	How important is it for you to maintain your ethnic customs and traditions?	
Sexual Liberalism	Abort	Do you think abortion is okay?	1 to 4 (<i>never</i> to <i>always</i>)
	LGBT	Do you think homosexuality is okay?	
	Cohabit	Do you think cohabiting is okay?	
	Divorce	Do you think divorce is okay?	
Gender Norms	Child	In a family, who should take care of the children?	<i>Mostly the Man; Both; or Mostly the Woman</i>
	Clean	In a family, who should clean the house?	
	Cook	In a family, who should cook?	
	Money	In a family, who should earn money?	
Beliefs About Integration	Retain (M)	Majorities should do all they can to keep their customs and traditions.	1 to 5 (<i>strongly disagree</i> to <i>strongly agree</i>)
	Adapt (I)	Immigrants should adapt to (the) [<i>host society</i>].	
	Open (M)	Majorities should be open to the customs and traditions of immigrants.	
	Retain (I)	Immigrants should do all they can to keep their customs and traditions.	

4 Data and Analytic Strategy

My analysis draws on the first wave of the *Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries* (henceforth CILS4EU) — the only round to feature data from the parents of youth respondents across the four participating countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The CILS4EU includes large samples of immigrant youth and their native peers across these four nation-states. The first wave of the survey was fielded in 2010-2011, a time when respondents were, on average, about 15 years of age.

Overall, my analysis proceeds in two major steps. In the first step, I fit a multigroup latent class analysis to capture the cultural identity profiles that are available to respondents before sketching two hypotheses based on my cluster solution. Prior to estimation, I restrict my sample to respondents who (i)

have migrant roots;³ (ii) responded to at least one item per cultural dimension (see Table 1); and (iii) have a parent or a child who was also surveyed. This yields an analytic sample of 8,212 parents and children for the first leg of my analysis. In Table 1, I provide definitions and ranges for the 16 input variables.

In the second step, I estimate a series of logistic regressions to evaluate my hypotheses. In each regression model, I treat youth respondents as my unit of observation and, in full models featuring a vector of control variables, “parent-level” indicators (e.g., parents’ cultural identity) as covariates for every child whose mother or father participated in the survey, yielding an analytic sample of 4,106 youth respondents. Supplementary Appendix A presents summary statistics for the variables featured in my analysis.

5 Latent Class Analysis and Hypotheses

To begin my empirical sequence, I use the 16 input variables outlined in Table 1— as well as my full sample of parental and youth respondents—to estimate a multigroup latent class analysis (LCA).⁴ Broadly speaking, LCAs search for common response patterns in the haze of survey data before clustering individuals into mutually exclusive groups based on their vector of responses to select items. Like other forms of unsupervised learning, the logic underlying LCAs is inductive: since there is no observed target variable to predict, researchers use LCAs to reveal hidden structures (or latent variables) in high-dimensional space by modelling the covariation between observed indicators. In the context of LCAs, this covariation is assumed to derive from a discrete latent variable — the class a respondent belongs to with respect to a latent attribute (here, cultural identity). In technical terms, conventional latent class models exploit the covariation between input variables to estimate structural and measurement parameters (class proportions and conditional item-response probabilities respectively).

To account for potential biases, I adjust the conventional LCA in two ways: first, I include direct effects between the ten pairs of items with the largest model residuals to account for violations of the local independence assumption (McCutcheon 2002); second, I restrict item-response probabilities to be equal across the four host societies to account for country-level effects, thereby generating multigroup, structurally homogeneous models (Kankaraš, Moors, and Vermunt 2011). With this specification in

³ The inclusion of “natives” would have required the omission of the Origins/Customs survey items (which only apply to immigrant-origin individuals). This would have impoverished the broader analysis presented in this manuscript, as attachments to the origin society are a key axis of cultural variation among immigrant-origin people and central to debates about cultural reproduction.

⁴ In the CILS4EU, questions about ethnicity were only available to respondents who indicated that they “belong” to an ethnic group. Among those who signaled such an ethnic attachment, the vast majority selected a response category in the 2 to 4 range for the two ethnicity items, leaving the lowest response category nearly unpopulated. In the spirit of simplicity, I assign all respondents who did not signal an attachment to an ethnic group a value of 1 for the two items related to ethnicity — the lowest value along the two ordinal scales.

place, I use model parameters to calculate the posterior probability of membership in each class for every respondent in my sample. To generate classifications and account for classification uncertainty in one fell swoop, I follow the *stochastic assignment rule* developed by Drouhot and Garip (2021) and treat class assignment as a random draw from a respondent's multinomial distribution of posterior probabilities.

LCA model parameters are estimated based on the number of latent classes chosen by the analyst. This number is unknown, but different solutions—or numbers of classes—will fit the data to a greater or lesser extent. Ultimately, the number of latent classes in a population of respondents is determined by the relative fit of candidate cluster solutions as well as interpretability. To make this determination, I estimate a series of LCAs using Latent GOLD 6.0. Then, I settle on a four-cluster solution based on interpretability, parsimony, and fit statistics. For more information about the fit statistics that guided the model selection process, see Supplementary Appendix B.

5.1 Results: Latent Class Analysis

I use Figure 3 to summarize the results of my preferred latent class model. In the figure, I visualize class-specific item-response probabilities for the 16 indicators listed in Table 1.⁵ To ease interpretation, I assign the following labels to these clusters: *host-oriented (HO) liberal*, *host-oriented (HO) traditionalist*, *multiply-oriented (MO) liberal*, and *ethno-traditionalist*. In the paragraphs below, I summarize each of these cultural profiles in turn.

Host-oriented liberals are deeply attached to the host society, score relatively low on subjective religiosity, and do not implicate their ancestral origins when sketching their self-portraits. Their attitudes towards sexual liberalism lend credence to the liberal suffix: e.g., the probability that someone with a HO liberal identity scores a 4 on the indicator probing acceptance of sexual minorities is roughly 0.67 (highest among the four classes). Consistent with these liberal sensibilities, nearly all HO liberals espouse egalitarian values and are extremely likely to report that men and women should make equal contributions to the family unit. At the same time, their beliefs about acculturation are more integrationist than they are multiculturalist: e.g., while HO liberals generally agree that immigrants should adapt to their societies of reception, they are less likely to support immigrants retaining their ancestral customs and traditions.

In terms of their ethnic attachments and beliefs about acculturation, *host-oriented traditionalists* bear a superficial resemblance to HO liberals. For these respondents, the society of settlement is the locus of ethnocultural identity, religious attachments are tenuous-to-moderate, and heritage society attachments are non-existent. Like their liberal counterparts, HO traditionalists endorse immigrant integration over cultural retention. Yet, if we shift focus to other attitudinal spheres, they bear a closer resemblance to ethno-traditionalists (described below), as they score relatively low on sexual liberalism

⁵ In Supplementary Appendix B, I chart the distribution of latent classes across the four survey countries and the distribution of classes by religious affiliation and parental status.




Figure 3: Estimated item-response probabilities for each latent class.

and endorse traditional gender norms: e.g., the probability that a HO traditionalist supports the male-breadwinner model is 0.70 (by far the highest among the four classes).

Unlike the host-oriented classes described above, *multiply-oriented liberals* display moderate-to-high levels of affect towards multiple ethnocultural categories. In other attitudinal domains, MO liberals exhibit response patterns that mirror those of HO liberals: e.g., they score relatively high on measures of sexual liberalism and are unmistakably egalitarian *vis-à-vis* their gender norms. Their beliefs about integration, on the other hand, represent a dynamic middle ground between integrationist and multiculturalist approaches to acculturation: e.g., while MO liberals generally agree that immigrants should adapt to the host society, they are less likely to support *majorities* retaining their customs and traditions than other respondents.

Finally, *ethno-traditionalists* are firmly attached to their ethnic origins, score very high on subjective religiosity, and have a relatively low affinity for the destination society. In terms of sexual liberalism and gender norms, ethno-traditionalists are a counterimage of respondents in the two liberal clusters: e.g., the probability that an ethno-traditionalist scores a 1 on the item about homosexuality is 0.60 (lowest tolerance of homosexuality among the four classes). Moreover, their beliefs about acculturation are more multiculturalist than they are integrationist: while they tend to agree that immigrants should adapt to the host society, they are also very likely to support majorities *and* immigrants retaining their cultural traditions.

5.2 Hypotheses

The results of my LCA provide a broad view of the cultural differences that distinguish individuals with migrant roots across four European countries. Moreover, they provide a measure of cultural identity that can be used to formalize claims about how religious affiliation *might* shape the intergenerational transmission of cultural identities. Based on these insights and the foregoing discussion, I formulate two basic hypotheses informed by the extant scholarship.

First, in light of the large literature documenting high levels of social conservatism and traditionalism among European Muslims (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Soehl 2017), I predict that Muslim youth “stand out” in cultural affairs because they adopt ethno-traditionalist understandings of the social world at a much higher rate than their non-Muslim peers and because they are much less likely to encode HO liberal identities.

Second, in line with intrafamilial explanations for this cultural gradient that are common in the quantitative literature, I expect that Muslim parents are more successful at transmitting their cultural identities to their children *vis-à-vis* their non-Muslim peers, in line with the *pluralist* path to incorporation. As noted, scholars tend to agree that cultural reproduction is especially common in European Muslim households (Drouhot and Nee 2019), even though the evidence for this claim is decidedly mixed once findings from ethnographic and interview-based work are considered.

Table 2: Variables in Main Regression Analysis

Variable	Definition
<i>Dependent Variables</i>	
Child's Identity Profile	Nominal variable with four levels: <i>Host-Oriented Liberal</i> (omitted), <i>Host-Oriented Traditionalist</i> , <i>Multiply-Oriented Liberal</i> and <i>Ethno-Traditionalist</i>
Transmission	Dichotomous variable: a value of 1 indicates that the parent and child were assigned to the same cluster (or possess the same profile)
<i>Student-Level Predictors</i>	
Religious Affiliation	Nominal variable with four levels: Islam (omitted), Christianity, Non-Affiliated and Other
Age	Age of respondent
Sex	Sex of respondent
Immigrant Generation	Factorized interval variable with three levels: 1 st Generation (omitted), 2 nd Generation (inclusive of the interethnic second generation), and Above 2 nd Generation (inclusive of the “2.5 generation”)
School Context	Immigrant proportion of child's school, discretized
<i>Parent-Level Predictors</i>	
Parent's Identity Profile	Nominal variable with four levels: <i>Host-Oriented Liberal</i> (omitted), <i>Host-Oriented Traditionalist</i> , <i>Multiply-Oriented Liberal</i> and <i>Ethno-Traditionalist</i>
Parent's Relation to Child	Dummy indicator of whether the parent is the child's mother or father
Parent's Job Status	Indicator of whether the parent is employed with three levels: employed, unemployed and missing
Parent's University Status	Indicator of parent's educational background with three levels: completed university, did not complete university and missing

Note: All models include country fixed-effects. Standard errors for all parameter estimates are clustered at the composite “host society-ethnic origin” level. Highlighted variables enter the models as part of a three-way interaction.

6 Analysis and Results

To evaluate these hypotheses, I use a series of logistic regressions. I fit four models in total: two multinomial logistic regressions and two binomial logistic regressions. For my multinomial specifications, I regress a child's cultural identity profile on religious affiliation (the baseline model) or religious affiliation and a vector of regressors (the full model). For my binomial specifications, I predict the likelihood of transmission—or the probability that a parent and child are assigned to the same cluster—in models with just the religious affiliation indicator (the baseline model) or the full covariate adjustment set (the full model).

Table 2 offers an overview of the variables used in my regressions. As detailed in the table, the two *full* models adjust for a variety of background variables. These include student-level sociodemographic attributes (e.g., age and sex) that exert their own independent effects on identity formation (Bussey and

Bandura 1999; Hockey and James 2002); contextual characteristics (e.g., the proportion of immigrants in a respondent’s school) that can powerfully shape the social resonance of ethnocultural identities (Kruse and Kroneberg 2019; Veerman and Platt 2021); and parent-level attributes (e.g., whether the parent interviewed is a mother or father, proxies for parental socioeconomic status) that can structure parental socialization (Roubinov and Boyce 2017; Sánchez Guerrero and Schober 2021).

Moreover, the two full models allow interactions between parental identity and religious affiliation to vary across immigrant generations on the right-hand side. Concretely, this three-way interaction allows religious affiliation, generational status, and parental identity to *jointly* influence the cultural sensibilities of youth respondents and the intergenerational dynamics scrutinized in this paper — in line with a growing literature on how parental influences in immigrant families are powerfully moderated by immigrant generation (Driscoll, Russell, and Crockett 2008; Plunkett et al. 2009; Spiegler, Güngör, and Leyendecker 2016), as well as interactions between generational status and ethnicity (Kao 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Simon 2021).

In all four models, I include country fixed-effects, cluster standard errors at a composite “host society-ethnic origin” level (i.e., Turkish respondents in Germany and Sweden represent different groups) and apply adjusted senate weights to ensure that each country contributes equally to estimation.⁶ To facilitate interpretation, I display my results visually and relegate my broader set of findings to Supplementary Appendix C. To assess the robustness of my results, I perform additional analyses which are summarized in Supplementary Appendix D.

6.1 Do European Muslim Youth “Stand Out?”

According to my first hypothesis, Muslim children should “stand out” from their peers due to their high levels of religiosity and traditionalism. To evaluate this proposition, I turn to my multinomial logistic regressions. I do so in two steps. First, I use parameters from the baseline *and* full models to predict the average marginal effect (AME) of religious affiliation on the cultural identities of youth respondents. This should, in principle, allow me to map the association between religious affiliation and youth cultural identity before *and* after background variables are statistically adjusted.

In a second step, I use parameters from the full multinomial model to predict the share of youth respondents assigned to each cultural subsample at different levels of religious affiliation (after adjusting for background variables). This should highlight the distributional consequences of the AMEs reported in the first step.

⁶ The CILS4EU’s in-built senate weights are only valid if the *full* sample of respondents are used in estimation. I therefore produce an *adjusted* senate weight by following the same mathematical procedure detailed in the CILS4EU’s (2016) Technical Report for Wave 1.




Figure 4: Average marginal effect of religious affiliation on child's cultural identity profile (with 95% confidence intervals). Islam is the reference category. Baseline model features religious affiliation indicator and country fixed-effects. Full model features full suite of control variables (see Table 2). In both models, standard errors are clustered at the composite "host society-ethnic origin" level.

6.1.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results: AMEs

The AMEs I use to facilitate interpretation of my multinomial logistic regression models convey the average change in the dependent variable—the probability of assignment to a specific cluster—based on a unit change in a focal regressor for all respondents in my sample. Crucially, the AMEs I report for the full multinomial model implicitly account for the three-way interaction described in Table 2 (Arel-Bundock 2023). Across my regressions, Islam serves as the reference group for the religious affiliation indicator; thus, AMEs represent the average change in the probability for assignment into a given cluster (HO liberal, HO traditionalist, MO liberal or ethno-traditionalist) for Christians, the unaffiliated and those in other faith communities *relative* to Muslims.

In Figure 4, the panel on the left displays AMEs associated with my baseline multinomial model, while the panel on the right shows AMEs associated with my full multinomial specification. Therefore, moving from left to right should allow the reader to assess whether baseline associations survive the

inclusion of control variables. For instance, unaffiliated respondents appear to be significantly more likely to adopt HO traditionalist identities than their Muslim classmates in the baseline specification (panel on the left), but these associations disappear once background variables are controlled (panel on the right).

In most cases, however, regression adjustment does not meaningfully change the relative differences between Muslim respondents and their peers. Once we zoom-in on the panels near the top and bottom of Figure 4 (for both the baseline and full models on the left and right panels), a general pattern comes into focus: an affinity for ethno-traditionalist identities, and a disaffinity for HO liberal identities, is what distinguishes Muslim youth from their classmates.

For a more precise illustration, consider pairwise contrasts between Muslims and Christians in the top and bottom panels of Figure 4. Even after accounting for background variables in the full multinomial specification, the AME of being Christian (versus Muslim) on the probability of holding an ethno-traditionalist identity profile is substantively large (corresponding to a 0.28 decrease on the probability scale) and reaches significance. While moving in the opposite direction, the AME of being Christian (versus Muslim) on the probability of possessing a HO liberal profile is also large (+0.13) and statistically significant.

6.1.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results: Adjusted Predictions

The substantive implications of these differences are difficult to apprehend using AMEs alone. This is especially true given the discrete nature of the target variable (child's cultural identity). That said, conceptualizing cultural identity as a discrete variable has utility: it not only acknowledges the fundamentally *cultural* aspects of identification, but also reveals substantial heterogeneity within putative social groups. Yet, as Figure 4 makes clear, demographic attributes (such as religious affiliation) strongly *constrain* the types of cultural identities individuals adopt. I use Figure 5 to cast this point into sharp relief. The figure visualizes the predicted share of youth respondents assigned to each identity profile by religious affiliation (based on the full multinomial specification).

Here, we see the distributional consequences of the patterns reported in the preceding subsection. Even after regression adjustment, a *large plurality* of Muslim youth respondents would—per model estimates—be expected to adopt ethno-traditionalist identities. Conversely, only about 1 in 5 Muslim children would be expected to encode HO liberal identities.

As the four polygons visualized in Figure 5 suggest, no other faith community displays a similar distributional profile. Although distributions of cultural identity are unique for each of the three non-Muslim groups, their aggregate *profiles* (see the polygons) are clustered together in similar regions of the plot. These patterns, and the AMEs reported in Figure 4, are consistent with my first hypothesis: on an aggregate scale, Muslim children *do* stand out from their immigrant peers with respect to their cultural identities. Moreover, this distinctiveness appears to be rooted in the significantly *positive* association

Predicted Probabilities of Class Membership
(Youth Respondents)




Figure 5: Radar chart illustrating predicted cluster membership probabilities for youth respondents at different levels of religious affiliation (based on the results of the full multinomial logistic regression model). Each polygon represents a categorical distribution of predicted membership probabilities for a specific faith community.

between Islam and ethno-traditionalist profiles and *negative* association between Islam and HO liberal identities.

6.2 Are European Muslim Parents More Successful at Cultural Transmission?

According to my second hypothesis, that European Muslim youth gravitate towards ethno-traditionalist identities and away from HO liberal cultural profiles derives, in large part, from parent-to-




Figure 6: Predicted transmission probabilities by religious affiliation based on binary logistic regressions. Dotted lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals. Baseline model features religious affiliation indicator and country fixed-effects. Full model features full suite of controls (see Table 2). In both models, standard errors are clustered as the composite “host society-ethnic origin” level.

child transmission. To evaluate this proposition, I use both sets of regressions. First, I use binary logistic regression models to provide an intuitive test of whether transmission is more likely within Muslim households in Europe — or whether Muslim parents and children are, relative to their peers, more likely to end up in the same cluster. Then, I use estimates from multinomial regressions to paint a more granular portrait of the transmission process.

6.2.1 Binomial Logistic Regression Results

Figure 6 uses predicted probabilities to provide a summary of the key results associated with my binary logistic regressions. The baseline model provides *some* evidence that Muslim parents are more likely to transmit their cultural profiles than parents from other faith communities. However, this difference does not reach significance at conventional levels. Moreover, in the full model, transmission

appears *less* likely (at an α of 0.10) within Muslim households. This finding should be interpreted with caution, as it likely stems from conditioning on a variable (parent's cultural identity) that is downstream from religion along the causal path.

At the same time, including the parental cultural identity indicator in the full model offers insights that are invisible in the baseline specification. Specifically, it reveals (via predictive margins not shown here) that transmission rates within Muslim households are *very* high among parents with ethno-traditionalist identities (above 0.6) and *very* low for parents assigned to the other three clusters (0.31 and below). For context, the weighted (unadjusted) transmission rate for all parent-child dyads in my sample is nearly 0.5 (see Supplementary Table A1).

At first glance, these results suggest that the cultural distinctiveness of European Muslim children may be modestly shaped by parent-to-child transmission: i.e., if cultural transmission is common in Muslim households with ethno-traditionalist parents, and if the cultural heterodoxy of European Muslim youth derives, in part, from their propensity to adopt ethno-traditionalist views, then the cultural retention thesis may still hold some explanatory power.

However, the results of my full multinomial logistic regression model complicate this interpretation. Specifically, they show that high transmission rates observed in Muslim households with ethno-traditionalist parents mask a more general trend: the shift towards ethno-traditionalism among Muslim youth respondents of all stripes. I turn to these results below.

6.2.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results

Figure 7 plots AMEs derived from my full multinomial model and zooms-in on a pairwise contrast between Christians and Muslims. Concretely, the AMEs in the graph show the (associational) effects of parental identities on the cultural identities of Christian and Muslim adolescents. In the plot, parents with HO liberal identities serve as the reference group: i.e., each AME should be interpreted as the average change in probability associated with having a parent with a HO traditionalist, MO liberal or ethno-traditionalist profile *relative* to having a parent with a HO liberal identity.

Figure 7 suggests that parental influences are relatively acute for Christian youth respondents, as AMEs associated with parental identities tend to be large and statistically significant (see the panel on the left). For example, having an ethno-traditionalist parent (versus a HO liberal parent) corresponds to a 0.25 *decrease* in the probability of adopting a HO liberal identity and a 0.26 *increase* in the probability of encoding an ethno-traditionalist identity among Christian youth respondents. As the associated confidence intervals lay bare, these estimates are not only substantively large but easily clear the threshold of statistical significance.

Turning to the panel on the right of Figure 7, we see the opposite pattern. Among Muslims, AMEs associated with parental identities are rife with uncertainty: expected intergenerational elasticities




Figure 7: Average marginal effect of parent's cultural identity profile on child's cultural identity profile (with 95% confidence intervals). *HO Liberal* is the reference category. Results based on the full multinomial regression model. Standard errors are clustered at the composite "host society-ethnic origin" level.

that are pronounced for Christians are either muted or non-existent for their Muslim peers. Strikingly, the panel on the bottom right of Figure 7 suggests that the probability of a Muslim child adopting an ethno-traditional identity profile is not significantly associated with the cultural identity of their parent. Broadly speaking, this implies that the high transmission rates observed in Muslim households with ethno-traditionalist parents are inflated by a general shift towards ethno-traditionalism among Muslim adolescents of all backgrounds.⁷ To visualize this shift, Figure 8 uses estimates from the full multinomial model to perform a final illustration.

⁷ Significant associations linking parental ethno-traditionalism to the ethno-traditionalism of youth respondents emerge for members of "Other" religious groups — the smallest faith community in my sample (see Supplementary Appendix C). Thus, the moderation visualized in Figure 7 is not simply a function of sample size differences between Christians and Muslims.

Counterfactual: Cultural Identities Evenly Distributed Among Muslim Parents




Figure 8: Predicted cluster membership probabilities for Muslim youth respondents at different levels of parental identity (based on the results of the full multinomial model). Here, we see the predicted distribution of cultural identities among young Muslims (panel on the right) when parental identities are *held constant* (or controlled). Even in this scenario, 44% of Muslim youth respondents are predicted to encode ethno-traditionalist identities.

In Figure 8, I produce a grid of model predictions to highlight the probability of assignment into each of the four classes (panel on the right) for Muslim youth at each level of parental identity (panel on the left). Since each parental identity profile makes the same contribution to the predicted distribution displayed on the right-hand side of the plot, these estimates *necessarily* portray a counterfactual scenario where the cultural identities of Muslim parents are evenly distributed. Even in this counterfactual setting, 44% of all Muslim youth respondents would, per the estimates visualized in Figure 8, encode ethno-traditionalist identities. Taken together, the results displayed in Figures 6 to 8 do not support the idea that parent-to-child transmission is *especially* common within Muslim households. In Supplementary Appendix D, I show how an item-by-item analysis aligns with this general pattern.

7 Conclusion

7.1 Discussion and Summary

What explains the cultural distance between European Muslim youth and their peers? Previous research identified two key explanatory mechanisms: (i) discrimination from native majorities and (ii) cultural transmission within Muslim households. This article examined the second, intrafamilial

mechanism by using tools at the intersections of cultural and cognitive sociology.

With these tools in hand, I established that the cultural heterodoxy of young European Muslims is detectable within a high-dimensional belief space, in line with extant research on national identification (Fleischmann and Phalet 2018), attitudes towards cohabitation (Kogan, Fong, and Reitz 2020), anti-gay sentiment (Berggren et al. 2019) and a range of other outcomes. Having confirmed that the cultural lacunae between young Muslims and their peers can be observed when item-responses are analyzed holistically, I turned to the main puzzle motivating this paper: is the cultural distinctiveness of European Muslim youth *driven* by intergenerational transfers?

Using dyadic parent-adolescent data from four European countries, I find limited evidence in favor of this proposition. Strikingly, regression-adjusted predictions suggest that large pluralities of Muslim adolescents with *liberal*-minded parents have encoded ethno-traditionalist understandings of the social world. Put another way, extrafamilial forces appear to be pushing European Muslim youth of all backgrounds towards ethno-traditionalism.

This insight has been underappreciated in existing quantitative work on cultural transmission within immigrant families. Studies in this tradition have used average, population-level parameter estimates to measure intergenerational transmission along single issue domains or axes of personal culture, obscuring *population heterogeneity* among immigrant-origin respondents who nominally belong to the same faith community — a problem endogenous to survey research on attitudes (DiMaggio et al. 2018), quantitative studies of immigrant culture (Drouhot 2021), and analyses of “group” disparities more broadly (Monk 2022). By overlooking this internal diversity, the ethno-traditionalism of young European Muslims with liberally oriented parents has been *averaged out* of view in extant research. Using person-centered methods and a multidimensional treatment of cultural identity, my analysis was able to cast this ethno-traditionalist turn into sharp relief.

Broadly speaking, my results suggest that understanding this “turn” requires shifting analytic focus to forces crystallizing outside the family unit. A key objective for future research is to list and describe these extrafamilial variables in some detail. As noted, existing studies suggest that structural discrimination is one such variable. Yet, discrimination-centric explanations in the quantitative literature often position Muslim parents as key cogs in the machinery of cultural reproduction and blocked acculturation, or as conduits who translate disadvantage from above into proximate sets of normative constraints and attitudinal prescriptions (cf. Wimmer and Soehl 2014). The results of my analysis do not neatly map onto this conclusion; rather, they suggest that discrimination can shape the cultural distinctiveness of Muslim youth independent of parental mediation.

Conversely, qualitative studies on Islamic revivalism in Europe *have* theorized how cultural discontinuities within Muslim households are emerging alongside diffuse anti-Muslim sentiment in greater society and have postulated that these dynamics are pushing young Muslims towards doctrinal forms of Islam (Becker 2021) — a mark of *reactive ethnicity*. Yet, studies in this tradition often assume that

young European Muslims are acquiring cultural identities that pair high levels of religiosity with relatively low levels of attachment to the origin society—belief patterns that were not meaningfully detected in my analysis. Instead, my results suggest that ethno-traditionalism is *enduring* at an aggregate level among European Muslims independent of parental influence, perhaps via complex, cross-level interactions involving *group*- or *meso*-level efforts at cultural reproduction (cf. Mannheim 1952); associative processes of cultural diffusion (Goldberg and Stein 2018); and the rigidity of symbolic boundaries in Europe (Alba 2005). Scrutinizing these cross-level interactions is an important task for future scholarship.

7.2 Limitations

Despite its empirical and substantive contributions, the present study has two limitations that warrant further discussion. First, parents who agreed to participate in the CILS4EU may differ in systematic ways from those who did not. As a robustness check, I develop post-stratification weights to adjust my analytic sample so that its covariate distribution (for student-level variables) matches the covariate distribution of the broader pool of *potential* immigrant-origin respondents in the CILS4EU. While regression results using the re-weighted sample are virtually identical to the results presented in the main text (see Supplementary Appendix D), this exercise cannot *directly* parse whether unobserved attributes among parents are driving the results presented in this manuscript. I see this as a fruitful avenue for future research to critically assess.

Second, my focus on parent-adolescent dyads places strong constraints on what can be said about the stability of cultural transmission over the life course. Recent longitudinal work shows that cultural beliefs, as well as the interrelationships among them, can ebb and flow within individuals before cohering in late-adolescence (e.g., Sánchez Guerrero et al. 2023). Therefore, the patterns documented in this study *could* break down (or even move in the opposite direction; cf. Dinas 2014) as young Muslims advance to emerging or early adulthood. While this possibility cannot be ruled out with the data at hand, discrete shifts in cultural identity would require multidimensional (or system-level) changes in personal culture that become increasingly unlikely with each passing year of adolescence, a time when belief systems grow markedly more constrained and stable (Keskintürk 2022). In subsequent assessments, scholars should use Markov models or sequence analyses to track the evolution of discrete cultural identities within individuals and evaluate whether the patterns reported in this paper are robust to the passage of time.

While the two limitations detailed above are important to keep in mind, the present study has, on balance, broken new ground. By providing new ways to conceptualize and measure cultural transmission among immigrant-origin respondents, it has offered a blueprint for embedding cognitivist models of culture into quantitative analyses of immigrant integration. Moving forward, more cross-pollination between the sociological subfields of culture, cognition, and migration can help us better theorize and measure the microfoundations of immigrant culture.

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Supplementary Appendix

A Descriptives



Figure A1: Distribution of indicator responses (pooled across countries). For variable definitions, see main text.

Table A1: Weighted Summary Statistics

<i>Dependent Variables</i>	Child's Cultural Identity	
	Host-Oriented Liberal	34.95%
	Host-Oriented Traditionalist	28.98%
	Multiply-Oriented Liberal	19.67%
	Ethno-Traditionalist	16.40%
	Transmission	
<i>Student-Level Predictors</i>	Unsuccessful	50.24%
	Successful	49.76%
	Religious Affiliation	
	Islam	11.12%
	Christianity	46.09%
	No Affiliation	34.74%
	Other	8.05%
	Age in Years	
	Age	15.40 ($\delta = 0.61$)
	Sex or Gender	
	Male	47.31%
	Female	52.69%
	Immigrant Generation	
	1 st Generation	14.16%
	2 nd Generation	37.03%
	Above 2 nd Generation	48.81%
	School Context	
	0-10% Immigrants	35.58%
	10-30% Immigrants	39.42%
	30-60% Immigrants	13.86%
	60-100% Immigrants	5.96%
	Independent Schools (EN)	5.19%
<i>Parent-Level Predictors</i>	Parent's Cultural Identity	
	Host-Oriented Liberal	41.58%
	Host-Oriented Traditionalist	20.99%
	Multiply-Oriented Liberal	19.50%
	Ethno-Traditionalist	17.92%
	Parent's Relation to Child	
	Father	21.08%
	Mother	78.92%
	Parent's Employment Status	
	Unemployed	21.29%
	Employed	78.49%
	Missing	0.23%
	Parent's University Status	
	Did Not Complete University	70.35%
	Completed University	28.44%
	Missing	1.21%

B Latent Class Analysis

B.1 Fit Statistics




Figure B1: Relative fit of a series of multigroup latent class models.

B.2 Weighted Distributions of Latent Classes

Parental Respondents

Islam



Christianity



No Affiliation



Other



■ Host-Oriented Liberal ■ Host-Oriented Traditionalist ■ Multiply-Oriented Liberal ■ Ethno-Traditionalist

Youth Respondents

Islam



Christianity



No Affiliation



Other



■ Host-Oriented Liberal ■ Host-Oriented Traditionalist ■ Multiply-Oriented Liberal ■ Ethno-Traditionalist

Figure B2: Weighted distribution of latent classes by religious affiliation and parental status.

Across Survey Countries




Figure B3: Weighted distribution of latent classes by survey country.

C Regression Tables and Additional Illustrations

Table C1: Full Binary Logistic
Regression Results

	AME	z
Parent's Cultural Identity		
Host-Oriented Liberal	—	—
Host-Oriented Traditionalist	0.05	1.14
Multiply-Oriented Liberal	-0.15	-3.79
Ethno-Traditionalist	-0.13	-3.07
Religious Affiliation		
Islam	—	—
Christianity	0.12	1.79
No Affiliation	0.12	1.91
Other	0.11	1.32
Immigrant Generation		
1 st Generation	—	—
2 nd Generation	0.03	0.83
Above 2 nd Generation	0.04	0.99
Age		
Age (Years)	-0.03	-1.65
Sex or Gender		
Male	—	—
Female	0.05	2.19
School Context		
0 to 10% Immigrants	—	—
10 to 30% Immigrants	-0.06	-1.84
30 to 60% Immigrants	-0.09	-2.71
60 to 100% Immigrants	-0.11	-4.00
Independent Schools (EN)	-0.07	-0.71
Parent's Relation to Child		
Father	—	—
Mother	-0.01	-0.29
Parent's University Status		
Did Not Complete University	—	—
Completed University	0.01	0.37
Missing	0.17	1.56
Parent's Employment Status		
Unemployed	—	—
Employed	-0.05	-1.65
Missing	-0.22	-1.08
Country		
England	—	—
Germany	-0.02	-0.59
Netherlands	-0.03	-0.73
Sweden	0.10	3.09

Note: Model features 4,065 respondents. Highlighted cells indicate that a marginal effect is significant at an α of at least 0.05 (teal) or 0.10 (pink). AMEs account for three-way interaction between parental identity, immigrant generation and religious affiliation. Z-statistics reflect standard errors clustered at a composite “host society-ethnic origin” level.

Table C2: Full Multinomial Logistic Regression Results

	Host-Oriented Liberal		Host-Oriented Traditionalist		Multiply-Oriented Liberal		Ethno-Traditionalist	
	AME	z	AME	z	AME	z	AME	z
Parent's Cultural Identity								
Host-Oriented Liberal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Host-Oriented Traditionalist	-0.18	-5.47	0.17	5.32	-0.04	-1.38	0.04	1.94
Multiply-Oriented Liberal	-0.16	-4.93	-0.05	-1.74	0.14	4.35	0.07	3.65
Ethno-Traditionalist	-0.21	-4.10	-0.04	-0.95	0.06	1.42	0.19	6.45
Religious Affiliation								
Islam	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Christianity	0.13	2.56	0.13	2.28	0.03	0.91	-0.28	-4.34
No Affiliation	0.20	3.95	0.09	1.56	0.09	2.22	-0.38	-5.71
Other	0.12	1.61	0.03	0.45	0.14	2.13	-0.28	-4.38
Immigrant Generation								
1 st Generation	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2 nd Generation	0.00	0.11	0.04	1.14	0.04	1.23	-0.08	-2.68
Above 2 nd Generation	0.09	2.41	0.10	3.36	-0.07	-2.22	-0.13	-3.79
Age								
Age (Years)	-0.03	-1.16	0.03	1.08	0.00	-0.31	0.01	0.54
Sex or Gender								
Male	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Female	0.09	3.46	-0.10	-4.61	0.06	3.19	-0.05	-3.01
School Context								
0 to 10% Immigrants	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10 to 30% Immigrants	0.00	0.07	-0.04	-1.67	0.01	0.56	0.03	1.28
30 to 60% Immigrants	-0.01	-0.46	-0.04	-1.48	0.03	1.06	0.03	1.45
60 to 100% Immigrants	-0.09	-2.71	0.00	-0.10	0.05	1.48	0.05	2.07
Independent Schools (EN)	0.00	-0.02	-0.13	-1.42	0.04	0.76	0.09	1.00
Parent's Relation to Child								
Father	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mother	0.04	1.04	-0.04	-1.16	0.01	0.43	0.00	-0.26
Parent's University Status								
Did Not Complete University	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Completed University	0.05	1.91	-0.04	-1.58	0.04	1.81	-0.05	-2.61
Missing	-0.24	-4.08	0.00	0.05	0.24	2.33	0.00	-0.07
Parent's Employment Status								
Unemployed	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Employed	0.04	1.36	-0.06	-2.08	0.00	-0.15	0.02	1.29
Missing	0.18	1.54	-0.19	-2.34	-0.01	-0.15	0.03	0.37
Country								
England	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Germany	-0.07	-1.96	0.07	2.10	-0.05	-1.68	0.05	2.46
Netherlands	-0.14	-3.39	0.10	2.25	0.00	-0.01	0.04	1.29
Sweden	0.06	1.61	-0.10	-3.03	0.11	2.93	-0.07	-3.61

Note: Model features 4,065 respondents. Highlighted cells indicate that a marginal effect is significant at an α of at least 0.05 (teal) or 0.10 (pink). AMEs account for three-way interaction between parental identity, immigrant generation and religious affiliation. Z-statistics reflect standard errors clustered at a composite “host society-ethnic origin” level.





Figure C1: Average marginal effect of *parental ethno-traditionalism* (i.e., the assignment of parental respondents to the ethno-traditionalist cluster) on child's cultural identity (with 95% confidence intervals). Parents with *HO liberal* identities serve as the reference category. Results based on the full multinomial regression model. Standard errors are clustered at the composite "host society-ethnic origin" level. Overall, this visualization illustrates how parental ethno-traditionalism is significantly associated with ethno-traditionalism among Christian youth respondents *and* youth respondents from "Other" faith communities—even though individuals from the "Other" category comprise the smallest religious group in my weighted sample (see Table A1). Broadly speaking, this suggests that the noisy associations linking parental identities to the cultural identities of youth respondents among Muslims is not simply rooted in sample size considerations. Figure C2 builds on this point.



Note: panel text highlighted in pink mark significant pairwise contrasts between ethno-traditionalist parents and their peers (within a given faith community).

Figure C2: Predicted probabilities of youth respondents adopting ethno-traditionalist understandings of the social world at the intersections of (i) religious affiliation and (ii) parental identity. Results based on full multinomial model. Standard errors are clustered at the composite “host society-ethnic origin” level. As the plot caption notes, highlighted panel text indicates that predictions for *host-oriented liberal* parents, *host-oriented traditionalist* parents, and *multiply-oriented liberal* parents are significantly different than model predictions for parents with *ethno-traditionalist* views (horizontal line) at an α of 0.05. Negative percentages to the right of the bubbles indicate decreases in the probability of child ethno-traditionalism *relative to the horizontal line* — i.e., parents with ethno-traditionalist identities. Despite their relatively small sample size, differences in the likelihood of child ethno-traditionalism among parents in the “Other” category are stark and easily reach significance: e.g., the probability of child ethno-traditionalism among “Other” parents with *HO liberal* identities is roughly 90% less than the probability that “Other” parents with *ethno-traditionalist* views have children with ethno-traditionalist sensibilities. Among Muslims, the likelihood of ethno-traditionalism among youth respondents is extremely high across the board. More precisely, differences in predicted probabilities do not vary much along the lines of parental identity; moreover, these differences do not clear the threshold of statistical significance and are substantively (and comparatively) small.

D Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analyses

D.1 Item-Level Intergenerational Associations

Table D1: Item-Level Cultural Elasticities

	ISLAM	CHRISTIANITY	NO AFFILIATION	OTHER
ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS				
POLYCHORIC CORRELATION				
Host	0.36	0.48	0.33	0.37
Religion	0.51	0.54	0.21	0.46
Origin	0.17	0.54	0.43	0.37
Customs	0.15	0.50	0.38	0.37
SEXUAL LIBERALISM				
POLYCHORIC CORRELATION				
Abort	0.34	0.55	0.37	0.61
LGBT	0.46	0.50	0.39	0.66
Cohabit	0.38	0.48	0.35	0.51
Divorce	0.31	0.42	0.37	0.42
GENDER NORMS				
CRAMÉR'S V				
Child	0.16	0.13	0.14	0.29
Cook	0.14	0.21	0.23	0.26
Money	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.19
Clean	0.24	0.14	0.22	0.13
BELIEFS ABOUT INTEGRATION				
POLYCHORIC CORRELATION				
Retain (M)	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.25
Adapt (I)	0.23	0.19	0.25	0.21
Open (M)	0.13	0.16	0.24	0.13
Retain (I)	0.16	0.22	0.13	0.27




Figure D1: Average marginal effects (AMEs) of parental attitudes on the attitudes of youth respondents (at the item-level) — adjusting for all background variables listed in the main text. All models are weighted linear regressions. AMEs associated with gender norms are derived from linear probability models predicting an egalitarian response (e.g., *both* women and men should take care of children, cook, earn money, and clean).

D.2 Cultural Variation Across Latent Classes: Additional Analyses




Figure D2: A visual summary of cultural differences between respondents assigned to different latent clusters (e.g., *host-oriented liberal* vs. *multiply-oriented liberal*, *ethno-traditionalist* vs. *host-oriented traditionalist* and so on) — for Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. To generate this summary, I estimated 16 weighted linear regressions with country fixed-effects, a control for parental status and a religious affiliation \times cluster membership interaction on the right-hand side—i.e., to predict item-level variation for each of the indicators used to fit my multigroup LCA (as before, quantities associated with gender norms are derived from linear probability models predicting egalitarian responses; standard errors for all models are clustered at “origin-host society” and “dyad” levels). Then, I generated counterfactual item-level predictions for each respondent in my analytic sample, before computing *average* standardized predictions (at the item-level) for each of the cultural subsamples identified through my LCA — for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Using the *two* corresponding 4×16 grids of estimates, I calculated the Euclidean distance between vectors of marginalized predictions for each pair of cultural clusters in my sample (along religious lines). This plot visualizes these pairwise matchups.




Figure D3: A visual summary of marginalized *contrasts* between different latent classes at the item-level — **for non-Muslims**. While Figure D2 highlights aggregate differences across clusters, the current figure visualizes model-based contrasts—or pairwise differences in adjusted predictions—associated with assignment to the four cultural subsamples for each of the weighted linear regressions described in the caption for Figure D2 (among non-Muslims). Contrasts are *standardized* at the item-level, and then averaged. The size of a bubble corresponds to the absolute value of a standardized contrast, while the bubble's color or hue signals whether the contrast reaches significance at an α of 0.05 or 0.10. In the figure, **MOL** stands for *multiply-oriented liberal*; **HOT** stands for *host-oriented traditionalist*; **HOL** stands for *host-oriented liberal*; and **ET** stands for *ethno-traditionalist*.




Figure D4: A visual summary of marginalized *contrasts* between different latent classes at the item-level — **for Muslims**. While Figure D2 highlights aggregate differences across clusters, the current figure visualizes model-based contrasts—or pairwise differences in adjusted predictions—associated with assignment to the four cultural subsamples for each of the weighted linear regressions described in the caption for Figure D2 (among Muslim respondents). Contrasts are *standardized* at the item-level, and then averaged. The size of a bubble corresponds to the absolute value of a standardized contrast, while the bubble's color or hue signals whether the contrast reaches significance at an α of 0.05 or 0.10. In the figure, **MOL** stands for *multiply-oriented liberal*; **HOT** stands for *host-oriented traditionalist*; **HOL** stands for *host-oriented liberal*; and **ET** stands for *ethno-traditionalist*.

D.3 Main Regression Results (Robustness Checks)



Figure D5: Comparing the predicted likelihood of cultural transmission across the four faith communities featured in my analysis. The top panel represents the *original* results (as presented in the main text), based on a latent class solution of $k = 4$. The bottom panel represents a robustness check: i.e., predicted cultural transmission probabilities (by religious affiliation) based on a $k = 5$ cluster solution.




Figure D6: Robustness checks (full multinomial logistic regression). Here, I zoom-in on the most striking substantive finding presented in the main text: i.e., the noisy associations linking parental identities to ethno-traditionalist identities among Muslims. To assess the robustness of my results, I fit two supplementary models: (1) **Re-Weighted**, where I use the ANES raking algorithm to re-weight my analytic sample so that its covariate distribution (for student-level variables) matches the covariate distribution of the broader pool of *potential* immigrant-origin respondents in the CILS4EU; and (2) **Second Generation**, where the analysis is limited to second-generation respondents [this model specification retains the *three-way* interaction featured in the main text by including the broader indicator of immigrant generation (i.e., 0.25 intervals to distinguish generations) available in the CILS4EU].